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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AS A DETERMINANT OF HEALTH
Ana Santos Rutschman*
Abstract 
Public health literature has long recognized the existence of determinants of health, a set 
of socio-economic conditions that affect health risks and health outcomes across the world. The 
World Health Organization defines these determinants as “forces and systems” consisting of 
“factors combin[ing] together to affect the health of individuals and communities.” Frameworks 
relying on determinants of health have been widely adopted by countries in the global South and 
North alike, as well as international institutional players, several of which are direct or indirect 
players in transnational intellectual property (IP) policymaking. Issues raised by the 
implementation of IP policies, however, are seldom treated as an integral part of analyses using 
these frameworks, even though IP bears direct effects on the dynamics of several determinants of 
health, such as access to health goods and health services.  
This paper conceptualizes post-TRIPs IP as a contributing element to the literature on the 
socio-economic determinants of health. IP norms and policies have long been understood as 
playing a role in outcomes that closely align with determinants frameworks, but interventions 
inspired by institutions relying on determinants frameworks routinely fail to consider the role of 
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International and Comparative Law. S.J.D., Duke Law School. For accompanying each step of this article and for their 
mentoring, I am grateful to Rochelle Dreyfuss, Maggie Chon, Gian Luca Burci, Judit Rius and Bhaven Sampat. I am 
also grateful to Dmitry Karshtedt, Nicholson Price, Sarah Rajec and Joy Xiang for insightful comments on early drafts 
of this piece. An earlier version of the article was presented and workshopped at the 2020 (virtual) annual meeting of 
the American Society of International Law as part of the Fifth Annual Detlev F. Vagts Roundtable: Conceptualizing 
Intellectual Property as a Social Determinant of Health. 
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international IP regimes. This paper explores two consequences of this dissociation: first, it argues 
that TRIPs-implemented IP materially affects several determinants of health, both at the social 
and economic levels; and second, it argues that IP should be regarded on equal footing with other 
canonically recognized determinants of health. While taking steps towards the development of an 
IP framework that can be articulated with, and incorporated by, literature on the determinants of 
health, the paper presents three short case studies on pharmaceutical and agricultural 
technologies—HIV prophylactic drugs (Truvada); drugs and vaccines needed for epidemic and 
pandemic preparedness (Ebola vaccines and COVID-19 treatments like remdesivir); and 
genetically modified rice crops. 
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I. IP AND THE DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES
A. THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
Public health-oriented scholars, policymakers and institutions have long recognized the 
existence of a series of non-clinical factors that affect the health of populations across the globe. 
Known as the determinants of health, these factors consist in a set of socio-economic conditions 
that are likely to bear a significant impact on health risks and health outcomes. 
Work around the determinants of health is anchored in the idea that there are profound 
“inequalities in health” within populations in the same country.1 Within the United States, for 
instance, different literatures have repeatedly documented disparities in morbidity and mortality 
rates depending on a range of non-clinical factors that ultimately have an impact on the quality of 
life and health outcomes associated with certain populations.2 These factors include race, ethnicity, 
1 Michael Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 LANCET 1099 (2005). 
2 See e.g Allan S. Noonan et al., Improving the Health of African Americans in the USA: An Overdue Opportunity 
for Social Justice, 37 PUB. HEALTH REV. 12 (2016); U.S. NAT’L CTR. HEALTH STATS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES,
2015: WITH SPECIAL FEATURE ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC HEALTH DISPARITIES (2015), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus15.pdf; U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITIES CONTINUE IN PREGNANCY-RELATED DEATHS (Sept. 5, 2019); (collectively documenting race- and 
ethnicity-based disparities). See also DovileVilda et al., Income Inequality and Racial Disparities in Pregnancy-
Related Mortality in the US, 9 SSM POP. HEALTH 1 (2019) (focusing on income inequality); Keith P. Gennuso et al., 
Deaths of Despair(ity) in Early 21st Century America: The Rise of Mortality and Racial/Ethnic Disparities 57 AM.
J. PREVENTIVE MED. 585 (Sept. 24, 2019) (focusing on diseases of despair).; David Hartley, Rural Health 
Disparities, Population Health, and Rural Culture, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1675 (2004) (focusing on rural 
disparities). For an overview of some of the legal and health policy problems affecting the overall functioning of the 
United States healthcare system, see generally ELIZABETH ROSENTHAL, AN AMERICAN SICKNESS, PENGUIN (2017). 
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gender, state of residency (or even zip code within a city),3 education, class4 and income.5 Similar 
studies have arrived at comparable conclusions within other countries in the Global North,6 as well 
as within countries across the Global South.7 Moreover, these disparities are also detected through 
comparisons between analogous populations in different countries or geographical regions.8
An important characteristic of the global distribution of health disparities is that they have 
become systemically ingrained in economies of the Global South and the Global North alike.9 But 
even though they are heterogenous in origin and kind, these inequalities have been found to share 
3 See Jay Bhatt, Your Zip Code, Your Health, AM. HOSP. ASS’N (May 16, 2018). See also ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON 
FOUND., COULD WHERE YOU LIVE INFLUENCE HOW LONG YOU LIVE?, 
https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/interactives/whereyouliveaffectshowlongyoulive.html. 
4 Stephen L. Isaacs & Steven A. Schroeder, Class—The Ignored Determinant of the Nation’s Health, 351 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1137 (2004). 
5 Dhruv Khullar & Dave A. Chokshi, Health, Income, & Poverty: Where We Are & What Could Help, HEALTH AFF.
BRIEF (Oct. 4, 2018) [Hereinafter Health, Income, & Poverty]. 
6 See e.g. Johan P. Mackenbach et al., Trends in Health Inequalities in 27 European Countries, 115 PROCEEDINGS 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6440 (Jun. 19, 2018); Churnrurtai Kanchanachitra & Viroj Tangcharoensathien, Health Inequality 
Across Prefectures in Japan, 390 LANCET 1471 (Sept. 23, 2017); AUST. INST. HEALTH & WELFARE, Gavin Turrell et 
al., Health Inequalities in Australia: Morbidity, Health Behaviours, Risk Factors and Health Service Use (Apr. 6, 
2007). 
7 See e.g. Alba Llop-Gironés et al., Inequalities in the Access to and Quality of Healthcare in Mozambique: 
Evidence from the Household Budget Survey, 31 INT’L J FOR QUAL. HEALTH CARE 577 (2019); Nandini Oomman, 
Uzbekistan Inequalities in Health, Nutrition and Population, World Bank Report (2003), 
https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/29578; Celia Landmann-Szwarcwal1 & James Macinko, A 
Panorama of Health Inequalities in Brazil, 15 INT’L J. EQUITY HEALTH 174 (2016). See generally Christopher 
Garimoi Orach, Health Equity: Challenges in Low Income Countries, 2 AFR. HEALTH SCI. 49 (2009); Davidson R 
Gwatkin, Trends in Health Inequalities in Developing Countries, 5 Lancet 371 (Apr. 1, 2017). 
8 Marmot, supra note 1, at 1099. See e.g. WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT FILE ON HEALTH INEQUITIES,
https://www.who.int/sdhconference/background/news/facts/en/ (noting, inter alia, a “36-year gap in life expectancy” 
between Malawi and Japan). 
9 See e.g. Ichiro Kawachi, Socioeconomic Determinants of Health: Health And Social Cohesion: Why Care About 
Income Inequality?, 314 BRITISH MED. J. 1037 (Apr. 5, 1997). 
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a common trait: they are “socially determined,” in the sense that they emerge from complex 
decision-making processes.10 The idea of social determination seeks to emphasize the fact that lack 
of access to vital goods and services (such as water or health care) is not merely attributable to the 
existence of infrastructural or technical shortcomings in the status quo; rather, it is the product of 
a series of allocative decisions, often made by different actors and at different points in time, 
converging towards the ossification of structural inequalities and to the worsening of health 
outcomes within certain populations.11
The concept of, and framework for, the determinants of health thus arose against this 
background, and current policy interventions relying on determinants frameworks embody this 
approach. The World Health Organization (WHO), which defines the social determinants of health 
as “the conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age,”12 further notes that these 
conditions “are shaped by the distribution of money, power and resources at global, national and 
local levels. The social determinants of health are mostly responsible for health inequities—the 
unfair and avoidable differences in health status seen within and between countries.”13
It is important to note that current definitions of determinants of health are not 
homogenous. Several institutions distinguish between social and economic determinants, the latter 
category including factors like income levels and income distribution—which are often recognized 
as some of the most powerful predictors of health risks and outcomes.14 Several others, as well as 
10 Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, supra note 1, at 1101. 
11 Id., ib.
12 WORLD HEALTH ORG., SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, https://www.who.int/social_determinants/en/ 
13 Id., ib.
14 See e.g. NEW ZEALAND NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. HEALTH & DISABILITY, The Social, Cultural and Economic 
Determinants of Health in New Zealand: Action to Improve Health (1999), at 23, 
https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/publications/det-health.pdf. See also Yannish Naik et al., The 
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commentators and policymakers, take a hybrid approach, speaking of socio-economic 
determinants of health.15 For instance, in addition to providing the most diffused definition of 
social determinants of health,16 the WHO, in its framework for Health Impact Assessment 
methods,17 describes determinants of health as encompassing both “the social and economic 
environment,” and expands the concept to include “the physical environment,” as well as a 
“person’s individual characteristics and behaviors.”18
A number of other definitional approaches co-exist.  To give but one example, the U.S. 
Office of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion distinguishes between social and physical 
determinants of health.19 The former group includes many conditions long-recognized as social 
determinants, from access to healthcare services to quality of education and job training, as well 
as conditions recognized elsewhere as economic determinants (e.g. poverty levels).20 Physical 
determinants include exposure to toxic substances, interaction with the built environment, as well 
as consequences of climate change.21
Macro-Economic Determinants of Health and Health Inequalities—Umbrella Review Protocol, 6 SYST REV. 222 
(2017). 
15 See e.g. Samantha Artiga & Elizabeth Hinton, Beyond Health Care: The Role of Social Determinants in 
Promoting Health and Health Equity, KAISER FAM. FOUND. ISSUE BRIEF (May 2018), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-beyond-health-care. 
16 Supra, note 12. 
17 Health Impact Assessment are a “combination of procedures, methods, and tools by which a policy, program, or 
project may be judged as to its potential effects on the health of a population, and the distribution of those effects 
within the population.” EUR. CTR. HEALTH POL’Y., HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Gothenburg, 1999), 
http://www.healthedpartners.org/ceu/hia/hia01/01_02_gothenburg_paper_on_hia_1999.pdf. 
18 WORLD HEALTH ORG., HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT (HIA), https://www.who.int/hia/en/. 
19 U.S. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, 
https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020/topics-objectives/topic/social-determinants-of-health (2020).  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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The unifying thread in how existing definitions of determinants of health are populated 
resides in the fact that they are generally conceptualized as conditions that are external to 
healthcare systems.22 In this sense, a person’s income, education or exposure to harmful chemicals 
may contribute, directly or indirectly, to that person’s interaction (or lack thereof) with a given 
healthcare system. These contributing factors, however, are non-clinical in nature, even if they 
might create the need for clinical interventions. Recent studies looking at premature death rates 
have underlined the relevance of non-clinical factors in health outcomes: currently, only 10% of 
premature deaths in the United States are linked to issues arising in the context of clinical care; 
30% of premature deaths are attributable to genetic factors; and 60% are attributable to social, 
environmental and behavioral factors that fall under the general umbrella of socio-economic 
determinants of health.23
This article uses the expression “socio-economic determinants of health” in an expansive 
way, to include all types of non-clinical conditions that have been identified in the literature and 
in practice as bearing an impact on health risks and outcomes. Moreover, as detailed in the 
following section, the article seeks to articulate a connection between the canonical sets of 
determinants of health—as currently recognized in multiple literatures—and the impact of globally 
harmonized IP frameworks and norms. 
B. THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
The impact of IP regimes on discrete fields of health-related innovation has been studied 
by scholars in legal and non-legal fields alike. Since the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
22 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Ethics of the Social Determinants of Health, 364 LANCET 1092, 1092 (Sept. 18, 2004). 
23 Garth Graham & John Bernot, An Evidence-Based Path Forward to Advance Social Determinants of Health Data, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171025.721263/full/. 
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Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) came into force in 1995,24 commentators have noted a 
progressive but inexorable convergence of national and regional IP regimes towards higher levels 
of IP protection across the globe.25 While this upwards harmonizing trend has been a general 
feature,26 and not a specificity of the pharmaceutical and biotech domains, the TRIPs 
implementation battle over IP rights covering many of the technologies in these fields has been 
especially contentious.27 As the ratcheting up of IP protection through tendentially harmonized 
regimes28 has contributed to the divide between the Global North and South,29 perhaps nowhere 
24 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
25 See e.g. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. 
L. Rev. 323 (2004); Ruth Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property 
Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA LAW & TECH. J. 125 (2004); Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent 
Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM, in LORAND BARTELS & FEDERICO 
ORTINO, EDS., (2006); Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement 
Efforts: The State of Play, AM. U. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 15 (2010). 
26 See e.g. Denis Borges Barbosa, Minimum Standards vs. Harmonization in the TRIPS Context: The Nature of 
Obligations under TRIPS and Modes of Implementation at the National Level in Monist and Dualist Systems, in 1 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES (CARLOS M.
CORREA ED., 2010), 52-109. 
27 See e.g. Haochen Sun, The Road to Doha and Beyond: Some Reflections on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, EUR. J. INT’L L. 123 (2004); Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of 
WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the DOHA Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 613 (2004). 
28 But see Sarah Rajec, The Harmonization Myth in International Intellectual Property Law (draft on file with 
author) (challenging the centrality of harmonization concepts and vocabulary in TRIPs implementation narratives). 
29 See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2832 (2006); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS—Round II: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. R. 21, 21-22 (2004). 
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are escalating levels of patent protection as noticeable as in the field of health-related technological 
innovation.30
Even under globalized and globalizing IP frameworks, there is room at the domestic level 
for the development of country-specific bodies of IP law and practices. With regard to 
pharmaceutical and biotechnologies, lawmakers and law interpreters at the country level have 
experimented with different approaches, with varying degrees of success. India, for instance, 
availed itself of the transitional period granted by TRIPs,31 and even when compelled to apply the 
patent floors mandated by the Agreement, it carved out a patentability regime for pharmaceutical 
innovations that is significantly less permissive of secondary patenting than most other countries.32
However, the existence of strata of domestic patent law lodged amidst tendentially 
overprotecting national and transnational IP regimes, is not enough to address the differentiated 
types of problems created by the (mis)application of current IP laws, norms and philosophies to 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical innovation. Part of the problem lies in the origins of 
contemporary IP. As Jerome Reichman and Rochelle Dreyfuss have put it, “[t]he domestic patent 
laws as currently practiced were largely formulated for the inventions of the Industrial Revolution, 
and these laws still reflect the technological premises and concepts of the creative sectors as they 
30 See e.g. Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a 
Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. Int’l Econ. Law 469 (2002). 
31 See e.g. Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India's Patent System and the 
Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007). 
32 See Bhaven N. Sampat & Kenneth C. Shadlen, Secondary Pharmaceutical Patenting: A Global Perspective, 46 
RESEARCH POL’Y 693 (2017). See also Ravinder Gabble & Jillian Clare Kohler, To Patent or not to Patent? The 
Case of Novartis’ Cancer Drug Glivec in India, GLOBAL HEALTH (Jan. 6, 2014). 
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were then structured.”33 The foundational IP treaties,34 whose ethos and many a provision were 
absorbed by TRIPs,35 pre-date the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, and the TRIPs-induced 
race to ratchet up levels of protection has done little to account for the nuances of innovative 
processes in these fields, on the one hand, and for the very specific characteristics of the consumers 
of the emerging goods, on the other. As such, individualized contemporary IP regimes may be able 
to provide an ad hoc fix for a particular malfunction—as India did with regard to secondary 
patenting of pharmaceuticals36—through legislative, regulatory or interpretive interventions; but 
they have proven incapable of tending to systemic problems rooted in modern embodiments of IP 
that render different types of drugs and biotech products unavailable to populations in need37 or, 
in some cases, that make certain drugs unavailable across the globe.38
This irresponsiveness of IP systems has a direct bearing on health outcomes and risks faced 
by different populations around the globe. Traditionally, the dynamics of IP and issues surrounding 
the availability and price of pharmaceutical and biotech products have been understood as separate 
from the sets of issues that make up the universe of determinants of health, at least as currently 
adopted for operational purposes.  
33 Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on 
Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L. J. 85, 92 (2007). 
34 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 (as revised on July 14, 
1967 in Stockholm). 
35 TRIPs Agreement, Articles 2 and 9. 
36 See supra, note 32 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra, case study on HIV prevention drugs in the United States. 
38 See infra, case study on drugs needed during outbreaks of infectious diseases such as the recent Ebola and Zika 
epidemics and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 
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Socio-economic determinants of health are generally conceptualized as “health 
determinants outside the health-care system.”39 This view portrays the determinants of health as 
upstream factors that may lead an individual to develop a condition that requires clinical care, thus 
prompting engagement between individuals and healthcare systems. In this area, and by contrast, 
IP is normally associated with the provision of goods or services—in the form of drugs or 
treatments—that are made available to individuals once they engage with the healthcare system. 
In this sense, not only is there a conceptual divide between the domains of application of the 
determinants of health versus IP regimes, but IP is primarily regarded as relevant at the 
downstream level of healthcare provision. 
As illustrated in the case studies in Part II, this separation is artificial and does not correctly 
account for the on-the-ground impact of IP laws and norms. Consider the following scenario: a 
company or institution foregoes the opportunity to develop a relatively simple vaccine or drug for 
a known pathogen likely to cause an outbreak; the decision is primarily based on a prospective 
lack of return-on-investment; an outbreak occurs. This sequence, which reflects what happened 
recently with regard to COVID-19 drugs and Ebola vaccines,40 has profound implications from a 
public health perspective, as morbidity and mortality strain already-struggling health systems. But 
it is also umbilically tied to IP paradigms, and in particular to the incentives-providing function 
theorized under utilitarian IP approaches. From this perspective, IP becomes a contributing factor 
affecting health outcomes and health risks. 
Although different in kind, another example of the direct impact of IP frameworks—or, if 
nothing else, of IP-informed choices—in public health outcomes and risks is provided by countless 
39 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Ethics of the Social Determinants of Health, 364 LANCET 1092, 1092 (Sept. 18, 2004). 
40 Infra, Part II. 
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instances of excessive pricing of pharmaceutical products, which in recent decades has become a 
recurring feature of the United States drug pricing ecosystem.41 Part of this phenomenon is enabled 
by the proliferation of patents over pharmaceutical and biotech products, which can inhibit the 
entrance of generic drugs and, more broadly, competition.42 For instance, recent studies have 
shown that the manufacturers of the eight best-selling biologics drugs in the United States applied 
for an average of 151 patents for each individual biologic.43 Through the articulation of patent 
rights, market exclusivities granted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration44 and product 
hopping,45 sponsors of these drugs estimate that follow-on competitors are not able to enter the 
market for periods ranging from 31 to 48 years.46
Rising prices of pharmaceuticals and biologic drugs is likely not to be restricted to the 
Global North, as North-South bilateral and plurilateral agreements have become a tool for 
ratcheting up pharmaceutical and biotech IP rules and policies.47 Recently, a strand of commentary 
has attempted to counter this narrative by suggesting that the proliferation of trade agreements in 
41 See Inmaculada Hernandez et al., The Contribution of New Product Entry Versus Existing Product Inflation in the 
Rising Costs of Drugs, 38 HEALTH AFF. (2019). 
42 See e.g. Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential 
Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, KEITH MASKUS & JEROME H. REICHMAN, EDS. (2005). 
43 See IMAK, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED: HOW EXCESSIVE PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTING IS EXTENDING 
MONOPOLIES AND DRIVING UP DRUG PRICES (2018), at 2. 
44 See e.g. Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299 (2015); Heled, Patents vs. Statutory 
Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals - Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
419 (2011). 
45 See e.g. Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the FDA, 
104 IOWA L. REV. 1129 (2019). 
46 Supra note 43. 
47 Supra note 25. 
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recent years has not increased the prices of pharmaceuticals in developing countries.48 Work by 
Kapczynski, Sampat and Shadlen, however, has argued that there is insufficient empirical data 
documenting the actual impact that trade agreements have had on the prices of medicines across 
the developing world.49
The manifold ways in which IP can have a direct bearing on access to drugs (or other 
biotech products, such as fortified foods) by populations in need has direct consequences for the 
health of individuals, communities and health systems. For example, by laying out the legal-
economic construct that allows firms to limit access of indicated patients to HIV drugs, post-TRIPs 
patent law has a direct bearing on present and future health outcomes and health risks. At a time 
in which HIV epidemics ravage certain areas of the globe—and, importantly, in which patented 
drugs have been shown to be 99% effective in prevention infections among indicated 
populations—IP has provided the legal infrastructure on which certain players rely. In this sense, 
IP ought to be regarded as a determinant of the present status quo (and short- to medium-term 
outlook) of the current HIV epidemic in the United States, on par with other determinants of health 
that are specific to this area, such as income or geography. 
If it is true that the socio-economic determinants of health reflect a concern with entrenched 
inequality and allocative imbalances, then another link between determinants of health and IP—
particularly as implemented in the wake of the TRIPs Agreement—is the fact that the 
crystallization of a maximalist ethos in national and transnational IP regimes has profound 
distributional consequences. While exploring the multiple linkages between the evolution of IP 
regimes and equality, Margaret Chon has noted that not only are equality themes often absent from 
48 See Thomas J. Bollyky, What Past Trade Deals Reveal About Drug Pricing, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 28, 2016).  
49 Amy Kapczynski et al., Trade Agreements, Patents, and Drug Prices: Continuing the Debate, 572 Yale L. & 
Econ. Research Paper (2017) (further documenting several flaws in the Bollyky study). 
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IP discourses, but the opposite is true as well.50 The approach proposed in this article—considering 
IP as a core contributor to health outcomes and risks on par with other determinants of health—
seeks to connect IP-induced distributional imbalances to discourses centered on health 
(in)equality. 
Having sketched a possible relationship between the fields of IP and determinants of health, 
the article in Part II turns to specific illustrations of the impact of IP regimes on health outcomes 
and risks through case studies on different forms of technology. As a note, the examples conveyed 
by the case studies are neither exhaustive within a certain domain of biotechnology, nor are these 
domains the only ones in which an interaction between IP and socio-economic determinants of 
health can be discerned. Other possibilities include epidemiological or genomic data models 
(which may be hampered by the existence of proprietary rights over databases, for example)51 or 
the development of green technologies (which rely significantly on IP-based incentives 
frameworks).52
Although the case studies in this section cover different embodiments of biotechnologies 
used in innovations that have or may have an impact on the health of significant population groups, 
the point is not about the exceptionalism of biotechnology within IP, but rather about how several 
types of technology—in areas in which innovation has become primarily IP-driven—are being 
made available in ways that exclude, or may limit access to, swaths of indicated populations. One 
50 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property Equality, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 259, 261 (2010). 
51 See e.g. Stephen M. Maurer, Across Two Worlds: Database Protection in the United States and Europe in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY, JONATHAN D. PUTNAM, ED. (2001); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual Property Issues in Genomics, 14 
TRENDS IN BIOTECH. 302 (1996). 
52 See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, JOSHUA D. SARNOFF,
ED. (2016). 
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of the enabling factors for this exclusion is IP, through choices that are made at the beginning of, 
or during, R&D processes. The case studies thus seek to illustrate the impact of these choices on 
populations who are priced out of some inventions and populations who would benefit from 
relatively inexpensive medical technologies that are not developed due to a (perceived) lack of 
incentives for R&D.  
The case studies illustrate three different forms in which post-TRIPs IP regimes can 
produce these effects. The first one is via excessive pricing, in the context of access to HIV 
prevention drugs in the Global North. The second is via lacking incentives frameworks, in the 
Global South and Global North alike. And the third is via blocking patents—and more precisely 
about informational asymmetries arising in patent thicket situations—with primary effects on 
technologies needed to support nutritional health in the Global South. 
II. ILLUSTRATING THE INFLUENCE OF IP IN HEALTH RISKS AND OUTCOMES
A. A CASE STUDY ON PHARMACEUTICALS: PREVENTING HIV INFECTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY
As shown by Jerome Reichman and Rochelle Dreyfuss, progressive rounds of 
harmonization of international IP have had detrimental effects not only to populations in the Global 
South, but to populations in the Global North as well.53 The case of access to HIV/AIDS drugs 
illustrates this point. While a significant portion of the foundational literature on access to 
medicines focused on examples of these detrimental effects on countries in the Global South,54 an 
emerging strand of commentary on responses to the ongoing HIV epidemic in the North has 
53 Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on 
Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L. J. 85, 92 (2007). 
54 See e.g. William W. Fisher III &. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, The South Africa AIDS Controversy A Case Study in Patent 
Law and Policy (2005), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf. 
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identified problems in access to drugs and treatments that are ultimately attributable to a 
malfunction in patent regimes. This case study focuses on the response to the late-twentieth century 
AIDS epidemic in the United States, which turned R&D on drugs that could be used in the 
treatment and prevention of HIV into a public health priority.55
In the early 2000s, research demonstrated that a two-drug combo—emtricitabine and 
tenofovir disoproxil fumarate, which block an enzyme the virus needs in order to replicate itself 
within a human body—was effective in the treatment of HIV-positive patients. This new combo, 
which eventually came to the market under the brand name Truvada, gained FDA approval in 2004 
as part of a treatment regimen for HIV infection in combination with other antiretrovirals.56 The 
sponsor of the drug was Gilead, a large pharmaceutical company headquartered in California.57
Additional research conducted in the mid- to late 2000s showed that Truvada could also be 
used in the prevention of HIV infection.58 In 2012, Gilead sought and obtained FDA approval to 
market Truvada for pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP), making it the first commercially available 
drug to be used in HIV prevention.59 Even though Gilead started commercializing Truvada for 
PrEP as soon as it was licensed by the FDA, Gilead initially decided not to promote Truvada as a 
55 See Ronald Bayer, The Medicalization of HIV Prevention: New Opportunities Beset by Old Challenges, 92 
Milbank Quarterly, 3, 434 (2014) (summarizing the overall response to the AIDS epidemic in the United States). 
56 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., TRUVADA APPROVAL LETTER, 
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2004/021752s000_Truvada_Approv.pdf. 
57 GILEAD, https://www.gilead.com. 
58 Robert M. Grant et al., Preexposure Chemoprophylaxis for HIV Prevention in Men Who Have Sex with Men, 363 
N. ENG. J. MED. 2587 (2010); Jared M. Baeten et al., Antiretroviral Prophylaxis for HIV Prevention in Heterosexual 
Men and Women, 367 N. ENG. J. MED. 399 (2012). 
59  U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC STATEMENT ON FDA APPROVAL OF DRUG FOR HIV
PREVENTION (Jul. 16, 2012), https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2012/fda-approvesdrugstatement.html; U.S.
CTR’S DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PRE-EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS (PREP),
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/prep/index.html. 
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prophylactic, fearing an association with the promotion of unsafe sexual practices.60 Word of 
mouth, patient advocacy and the eventual endorsement of PrEP from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention in 201461 led the company to shift its approach in 2016, and it has since 
invested heavily in marketing.62
As brand recognition increased, so did the price of Truvada.63 When the drug was initially 
approved in 2004, without prophylactic indications, it was priced at around $650 a month.64 In 
2012, the year Gilead obtained FDA approval to market Truvada for PrEP, the price tag increased 
to $1,159 a month.65 In 2017, it had reached $1,500,66 and in 2018 it increased again to $1,600.67
In 2019, the price was $1,750 a month, or $21,100 a year.68 The increase in price has taken place 
over a period during which the number of PrEP users in the United States has skyrocketed. In 
2012, there were 8,768 users in the United States; by 2016, the year Gilead began promoting 
60 NBC NEWS, Switching Course, Gilead Markets HIV Drug for Prevention (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/switching-course-gilead-markets-hiv-drug-prevention-n690271. 
61 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV PREP GUIDELINES (May 14, 2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/2014/PrEP-Guidelines-Press-Release.html. 
62 NBC NEWS, Switching Course, supra note 60. 






67 Shefali Luthra & Anna Gorman, Rising Cost Of PrEP To Prevent HIV Infection Pushes It Out Of Reach For 
Many, NPR (Jun. 30, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/06/30/624045995/rising-cost-of-prep-a-
pill-that-prevents-hiv-pushes-it-out-of-reach-for-many (further noting that, for a period of time, Gilead waived up to 
$4,800 in out-of-pocket expenses for patients with commercial insurance plans). 
68 See Mark Terry, Trump Administration Sues Gilead Over Truvada PReP for HIV Prevention, BIOSPACE (Nov. 7, 
2019), https://www.biospace.com/article/trump-administration-sues-gilead-over-hiv-drug/. 
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Truvada, the number had climbed to 77,120.69 The combination of market expansion and price 
hikes transformed the drug into a reliable best-seller for Gilead: in 2016,70 it generated over $2.3 
billion in the United States market and over $3.5 billion globally.71 In 2019, domestic sales were 
up to $2.6 billion.72 Since 2004, Truvada has earned Gilead over $36 billion.73
Elsewhere in the world, generic versions of Truvada for PrEP are available at much lower 
price points. In France, for instance, the price of Truvada while on patent was around 400 euros 
($467) a month; through generic competition the drug is now available for approximately 190 
euros ($186) per month.74 These prices are still higher than elsewhere in the Global North: in 
Australia, PrEP currently costs around $8 a month.75
The cost of Truvada for PrEP in the United States has been identified as one of the major 
factors causing indicated HIV-negative patients not to take the drug.76 This deterrent effect is 
especially problematic as current levels of HIV infection in the United States are considered 
69 United States v. Gilead Sciences, Complaint [hereinafter Complaint] at 46. 
70 2016 was the year prior to FDA approval of the first generic competitor to Truvada in the United States market. 




73 See Christopher Rowland, Americans Pay $US2000 for Drug Costing Aussies Less Than $6, FIN. REV. (May 17, 
2019), https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/americans-pay-us2000-for-drug-costing-aussies-less-than-6-
20190517-p51odk. 
74 EU Door Opens for Generic Version of AIDS Medicine Truvada, MEDICAL XPRESS (Jul. 26, 2018), 
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-07-eu-door-version-aids-medicine.html. 
75 Rowland, Americans Pay $US2000 for Drug Costing Aussies Less Than $6, supra note 73. 
76 Luthra & Gorman, supra note 67. Additional factors include lack of knowledge about the drug, poor patient-
physician relationships and fear of stigma. 
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epidemic.77 Experts and public health-oriented agencies consider PrEP an especially effective way 
of addressing the epidemic, as data shows that regular use of PrEP reduces the risk of HIV by 99% 
in populations who do not use controlled substances, and at least 74% in those who do.78
The consequences of price-based deterrence affect both patient populations and regions of 
the United States in different ways. Today, the geographical distribution of HIV infection is 
uneven across America, with rural areas in the South and Puerto Rico being disproportionately 
affected.79 According to the latest available data, pertaining to 2017, Southern states reported 52% 
of new HIV diagnoses, with Western states a distant second at 19%, followed by 16% in the 
Northeast and 13% in the Midwest.80 However, even though the South registers more than half of 
new cases, studies mapping the use of PrEP suggest that fewer patients in this area have access to 
the drug than elsewhere in the country.81
Compounding the geographical disparities, new cases of HIV infection also affect certain 
populations in disproportional ways: 50% of all new reported infections occur among black and 
Latino gay and transgender populations.82 Among women—who account for slightly over 15% of 
77 HIV.GOV, WHAT IS ‘ENDING THE HIV EPIDEMIC: A PLAN FOR AMERICA’?, https://www.hiv.gov/federal-
response/ending-the-hiv-epidemic/overview. 
78 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, PRE-EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS (PREP), 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/prep/index.html. 
79 AIDSVu, Map (HIV Infection), https://map.aidsvu.org/map (providing an interactive account of the number of 
cases of HIV infection by county). 
80 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, HIV IN THE UNITED STATES BY REGION (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/overview/geographicdistribution.html (further reporting new HIV diagnoses in 
U.S. dependent areas to account for 1%). 
81 See Lenny Bernstein, This HIV Pill Saves Lives. So Why Is It So Hard to Get in the Deep South?, WASH. POST
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/this-hiv-pill-saves-lives-so-why-is-it-so-
hard-to-get-in-the-deep-south/2019/03/11/a221a784-354a-11e9-854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html. 
82 Robert Goldstein, PrEP Prevents HIV — So Why Aren’t More People Taking It?, Harv. Health Blog (Oct. 4, 
2019), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/prep-prevents-hiv-so-why-arent-more-people-taking-it-2019100417942. 
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total new infections—three quarters of reported new infections occur among women of color.83
These populations are also among the most likely to be underinsured or to have no insurance at 
all.84
According to CDC estimates, the overall number of people in the United States indicated 
for PrEP therapy is around 1.2 million.85 Gilead has indicated that only a fraction of this 
population, roughly 167,000 people, is taking Truvada.86 This corresponds to 18.1% of persons 
with indications.87 Among patients taking PrEP, three quarters of prescriptions are dispensed to 
white gay patients in coastal states.88
To be sure, this gap between geographical areas and populations indicated for PrEP and 
actual PrEP intake cannot be attributed exclusively to the high price tag of the drug. Factors like 
lack of awareness and concerns with stigma still play a role in limiting the intake of the drug.89
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the price of Truvada for PrEP remains one the major 
barriers for widespread adoption of PrEP.90 The excessive price tag is particularly concerning at a 
time when the levels of HIV infection in the United States continue at epidemic proportions. As 
83 Id., ib. 
84 Robert H. Goldstein et al., Being PrEPared — Preexposure Prophylaxis and HIV Disparities, 379 N. ENG. J. MED
1293 (Oct 4., 2018). 
85 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, VITAL SIGNS: STATUS OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS 
TESTING, VIRAL SUPPRESSION, AND HIV PREEXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS — UNITED STATES, 2013–2018 (Dec. 6, 
2019), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/wr/mm6848e1.htm. 
86 Shefali Luthra & Anna Gorman, Rising Cost of PrEP to Prevent HIV Infection Pushes It Out of Reach for Many, 
NPR (Jun. 30, 2018), supra note 67. 
87 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, VITAL SIGNS: STATUS OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS 
TESTING, VIRAL SUPPRESSION, AND HIV PREEXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS — UNITED STATES, 2013–2018 (Dec. 6, 
2019), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/wr/mm6848e1.htm. 
88 Goldstein et al., Being PrEPared. 
89 Id., ib. 
90 See Bernstein, This HIV Pill Saves Lives, supra note 81; United States v. Gilead Sciences, Complaint at 34. 
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commentators and AIDS activists have often pointed out: “We have the most effective tool for 
ending the HIV epidemic, and one reason we’re unable to scale up is because it costs so [much] 
unnecessarily.”91
The main driver of price inflation in the case of Truvada for PrEP is the monopoly-esque 
market position conferred by patents on the drug. Even though the relevant patents are approaching 
their term, only recently has their validity—and their instrumentalization in gouging the price of 
Truvada for PrEP—attracted public attention and scrutiny.  
An important part of the basic research on the drug combo that ultimately became the PrEP 
regimen was done by scientists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).92 While 
Gilead obtained four patents on an emtricitabine and tenofovir combo that would become Truvada 
in its non-prophylactic version,93 the CDC was granted four patents for its research on PrEP.94
After Gilead obtained FDA approval to market Truvada in 2004 for the treatment of HIV infection, 
work done through a partnership between the CDC and Emory University, and primarily supported 
by $50 million in federal grants,95 showed that the drug combo could also be used prophylactically. 
It was at this point that Gilead sponsored Truvada for PrEP and gained market approval for this 
91 See Anna Gorman, Cost of PrEP Is Out of Most People's Reach, HIV PLUS MAG. (July 9, 2018), 
https://www.hivplusmag.com/prevention/2018/7/09/cost-prep-out-most-peoples-reach. See also James Krellenstein 
et al., Why Don’t More Americans Use PrEP?, N.Y. TIMES (July 2016, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/prep-hiv-aids-drug.html. 
92 United States v. Gilead Sciences, Complaint at 1-2. 
93 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS (TRUVADA), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/search_product.cfm. 
94 Id., ib. 
95 See Christopher Rowland, An HIV Treatment Cost Taxpayers Millions. The Government Patented It. But a 
Pharma Giant is Making Billions, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pharma-giant-profits-from-hiv-treatment-funded-by-taxpayers-
and-patented-by-the-government/2019/03/26/cee5afb4-40fc-11e9-9361-301ffb5bd5e6_story.html. 
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new indication from the FDA. The patents supporting Truvada for PrEP are thus the same that 
supported non-prophylactic versions of Truvada. One expires in late 2020, and the remaining 
throughout 2021.96
Commentators and patent experts have made the case that the prophylactic emtricitabine-
tenofovir combo is quite distinct from the non-prophylactic one. 97  For instance, it was CDC that 
discovered and confirmed the prophylactic properties of the drug combo, as well as the appropriate 
dosing.98 As such, there is a distinct possibility that Gilead’s Truvada for PrEP may be infringing 
on CDC’s patent portfolio:99
While Gilead now holds rights in some of the active pharmaceutical 
ingredients used in PrEP, one of those ingredients (emtricitabine) 
was, in fact, discovered and patented by researchers at Emory 
University, who used federal funding for their research. In Gileadʼs 
hands PrEP was used as treatment and not prevention. It was the 
CDC that discovered that once-a-day oral PrEP can prevent HIV, 
and it was the National Institutes of Health and the Gates Foundation 
that funded the first clinical trials to prove that PrEP is safe and 
effective in people.100
In line with this view, the CDC notified Gilead of its patent applications and attempted to 
negotiate a licensing agreement with Gilead in 2017 and 2018, a proposition that the company 
96 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE 
EVALUATIONS (TRUVADA), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/search_product.cfm. 
97 See Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, United States v. Gilead: Can a Lawsuit Yield Better Access To 
PrEP?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2019) (noting that “the U.S. government very rarely goes to court to enforce 
its patents”). 
98 Complaint at 25. 
99 See Christopher J. Morten & Amy Kapczynski, United States v. Gilead: Can a Lawsuit Yield Better Access To 
PrEP?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 18, 2019) (noting that “the U.S. government very rarely goes to court to enforce 
its patents”). 
100 Id., ib.
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declined.101 In November 2019, the United States government, through the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), sued Gilead for patent infringement.102
At the time of the lawsuit, the HHS Secretary “recognized Gilead’s role in selling Truvada” 
but argued that “Gilead must respect the U.S. patent system, the groundbreaking work by CDC 
researchers, and the substantial taxpayer contributions to the development of these drugs.”103 In 
the complaint, the government characterizes Gilead’s behavior in repeatedly refusing to obtain a 
license as “malicious, wanton, deliberate, consciously wrongful, flagrant, and in bad faith.”104
Gilead has made the case that the company has heavily supported the clinical trials that 
resulted in FDA approval of Truvada for PrEP. In response, the government has said that “that 
claim is disingenuous. Its support of early clinical trials was typically limited to only the donation 
of study drugs.”105 Gilead has also suggested that the patents held by the CDC are themselves 
invalid “because the use of Truvada as prophylaxis was widely known at the time the CDC sought 
these patents.”106 Nonetheless, the company initially announced that it would not challenge CDC’s 
patents “because we value our collaborative relationship with the agency.”107 Three months later, 
101 Complaint at 58. 
102 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUM. SERV., PRESS RELEASE: UNITED STATES FILES PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUIT 
AGAINST GILEAD RELATED TO TRUVADA® AND DESCOVY® FOR PRE-EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS OF HIV (Nov. 6, 
2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/11/06/us-files-patent-infringement-lawsuit-against-gilead-pre-
exposure-prophylaxis-hiv.html. 
103 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH HUM. SERV., PRESS RELEASE (NOV. 6, 2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2019/11/06/us-files-patent-infringement-lawsuit-against-gilead-pre-exposure-
prophylaxis-hiv.html. 
104 Complaint, at 69. 
105 Complaint, at 37. 
106 Statement of Daniel O’Day, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Gilead Sciences, Inc. before the Committee 
on Oversight and Reform U.S. House of Representatives (May 16, 2019), 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/GO/GO00/20190516/109486/HHRG-116-GO00-Wstate-ODayD-20190516.pdf. 
107 Complaint, at 37. 
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however, it brought an inter partes review. In February 2020, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board 
at the Patent and Trademark Office ruled that Gilead had “failed to demonstrate it was likely to 
win its argument for overturning the patents held by the CDC.”108
In October 2019, Gilead gained FDA approved for a newer generation PrEP drug, 
Descovy.109 Descovy is also a combination of tenofovir and emtricitabine—but tenofovir 
alafenamide as opposed to the version of tenofovir found in Truvada.110
While the patent dispute between HHS and Gilead is still unfolding, it is worth noting that 
a direct relationship can be discerned between the IP-enabled pricing practices adopted by the 
manufacturer of Truvada for PrEP111 and the difficulties in controlling the burden of HIV infection 
in the United States: 
Another critical barrier to increasing access to PrEP in the United 
States has been the cost of Truvada®, which presently is only sold 
by Gilead, by virtue of U.S. patents that purportedly cover the 
product. This is a major reason that many at risk of HIV infection in 
the United States are not currently taking Truvada for PrEP®. Many 
AIDS activists and many in the medical community have criticized 
Truvada®’s price in the United States, particularly in light of HHS’s 
patents, the Government’s funding of clinical research on PrEP, and 
the relatively low cost at which Gilead apparently makes the 
product.112
108 Gilead v. U.S., IPR 2019-01455 (http://freepdfhosting.com/0a58c071ad.pdf); Gilead v. U.S., IPR 2019-01456 
(http://freepdfhosting.com/e4e6827eea.pdf). 
109 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA APPROVES SECOND DRUG TO PREVENT HIV INFECTION AS PART OF ONGOING 
EFFORTS TO END THE HIV EPIDEMIC (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-
approves-second-drug-prevent-hiv-infection-part-ongoing-efforts-end-hiv-epidemic. 
110 Ed Silverman, Gilead Loses its Challenge to a Pair of U.S. Patents for an HIV Prevention Pill, STAT (Feb. 5, 
2020). 
111 Gilead was the sole manufacturer in the HIV PrEP space until 2017, at which point the FDA approved the first 
PrEP generic. See Michael Mezher, FDA Approves First Generic Version of Gilead's HIV Drug Truvada, RAPS
(Jun. 9, 2017), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus™/news-articles/2017/6/fda-approves-first-generic-version-of-
gilead-s-hiv-drug-truvada. 
112 Complaint, at 48-49. 
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And while this case study explored only one embodiment of price gouging, the problem is 
systemic, affecting health outcomes and risks among diversified populations. For instance, with 
regard to drugs113 used in the treatment of some of the most serious conditions—from autoimmune 
diseases to oncology—price gouging of on-patent drugs remains a constant.114
B. A CASE STUDY ON EPIDEMIC AND PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS: FROM EBOLA TO COVID-19
VACCINES AND TREATMENTS
The existence of one or several patents is not the only IP feature that influences access to 
pharmaceuticals or biotechnologies by populations in need. In the case of off-patent drugs, there 
are several instances of products not covered by IP that fail to attract interest from manufacturers 
in the private sector. The FDA keeps a list of drugs with expired patents and market exclusivities 
for which there is no commercial interest, even though there is demand from indicated 
populations.115 This type of problem relates to a different dimension of IP, which determines which 
kinds of products enter the market, and that is conceptually and temporally distinguishable from 
pricing issues arising in connection with the commercialization of pharmaceuticals and biologic 
drugs. 
113 These drugs, known as biologics, are structurally different from the category to which Truvada for PrEP belongs. 
They are subject to a separate R&D and regulatory approval processes and tend to be exponentially more expensive 
that conventional drugs.  
114 See Ana Santos Rutschman, Regulatory Malfunctions in the Drug Patent Ecosystem, __ EMORY L. J. __ 
(forthcoming 2020).  
115 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., List of Off-Patent, Off-Exclusivity Drugs without an Approved Generic, 
https://www.fda.gov/media/105829/download. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Statement from FDA 
Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New Policy to Improve Access and Foster Price Competition for Drugs That 
Face Inadequate Generic Competition, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-
commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-policy-improve-access-and-foster-price-competition. 
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Utilitarian discourses depicting patents as incentives mechanisms for socially desirable 
innovation often emphasize the role of IP as a sine qua non of R&D in traditionally underfunded 
areas. These discourses tend to pay particular attention to biopharmaceutical innovation, which is 
known for high R&D costs, combined with significant risk of failure.116 Absent some form of 
exclusivity conferring lead time on the market, investors and R&D players are likely to underinvest 
or to allocate their resources elsewhere. 
While the prospective function of patents appears to be one of the drivers of 
biopharmaceutical R&D for mainstream or blockbuster drugs,117 scholars and commentators have 
found scant evidence that the patent system truly functions as a catalyst for R&D in the case of 
drugs with smaller markets—both in the case of markets of limited size, as exemplified by R&D 
on orphan diseases,118 and in the case of temporary markets, as exemplified by R&D on drugs, 
vaccines and other pharmaceutical products needed to respond to outbreaks of infectious 
diseases.119 Moreover, with regard to the latter, patent-driven models are often fundamentally at 
odds with public health imperatives of  preparedness—the ability of health systems to anticipate 
and operate proactively to develop response mechanisms to be deployed when an outbreak (or 
116 See e.g. WILLIAM W. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW, HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2003), at 316. 
117 See e.g. SERVIER, WHY PATENTS ARE NECESSARY FOR THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, (Sept. 10, 2014), 
https://servier.com/en/news/why-patents-are-necessary-for-the-pharmaceutical-industry/. 
118 See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
119 See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines: Takeaways from Recent Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 170 (2020) (addressing the problem of lacking R&D in the vaccine space); 
Yaniv Heled et al., The Problem with Relying on Profit-Driven Models to Produce Pandemic Drugs, 7 J. L. &
BIOSCI. __ (2020). 
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other public health crisis) occurs.120 Preparedness frameworks emphasize the need to develop and 
stockpile drugs and other pharmaceutical products needed to respond to an outbreak. Yet, current 
preparedness approaches are detached—both conceptually and in practice—from the legal 
ecosystem that is supposed to function as a catalyst for biopharmaceutical R&D.121
As noted in prior work, while large-scale public health crises such as the COVID-19 
pandemic paradoxically cure market failures for the development of vaccines and other 
pharmaceutical products needed to respond to an outbreak,122 they do not address this fundamental 
dissociation between IP as a system of incentives and current levels of R&D on pandemic drugs 
during the pre- or inter-outbreak period—which is exactly the period during which public health 
policy prescribes robust preparedness efforts. 
Consider the case of the vaccine R&D landscape prior to the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak. The 
diseases caused by Ebola and other pathogens in the same viral family (filoviridae) have been 
studied by scientists across the world for decades.123 The Ebola virus, in particular, was first 
identified in 1976.124 By the early 2000s, a promising vaccine candidate had been developed in 
North America, first through work largely performed and funded by the United States public sector 
as part the country’s post-9/11 bioterrorism preparedness strategy,125 and then through work 
120 See e.g. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Emergency Preparedness: Globalizing Risk, Localizing Threats, 320 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1743, 1743 (2018), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2712530 (noting that 
“[e]mergency preparedness requires proactive planning and funding”). 
121 See Ana Santos Rutschman, Vaccines and IP Preparedness in the Coronavirus Outbreak, NW. U. L. REV. OF 
NOTE (2020) (noting the role of intellectual property in pandemic preparedness frameworks). 
122 Ana Santos Rutschman, IP Preparedness for Outbreak Diseases, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1200 (2018). 
123 Id., at 1218-19.  
124 U.S. CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, WHAT IS EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE? (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/about.html 
125 U.S. NAT’L. INST. HEALTH, EBOLA VACCINES, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/ebola-vaccines 
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performed and funded by the Canadian public sector.126 The Canadian government applied for a 
patent covering a recombinant vaccine candidate targeting Ebola in 2003.127 It then continued 
R&D, estimating that clinical trials would start around 2008, with the vaccine being fully licensed 
and ready for distribution two to three years later.128 In order to move a vaccine candidate through 
the later stages of R&D (including clinical trials), regulatory review and manufacturing, the public 
sector normally collaborates with, or licenses the relevant technology to, one or more partners in 
the private sector, which has the resources and infrastructure to bring a vaccine to market. In the 
case of the Ebola vaccine candidate, however, the Canadian public sector struggled to attract 
potential licensees.129 An article published in the Canadian Medical Association Journal in 2005 
aptly described the ongoing situation through its title: “Wanted: Manufacturer for Ebola and 
Marburg Vaccines.”130 Eventually, the vaccine was licensed to a small American pharmaceutical 
company, NewLink, which received an exclusive license “make, use, improve, develop and 
commercialize” the vaccine.131 Until the beginning of the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak, however, 
126 Francis A. Plummer & Steven M. Jones, The Story of Canada’s Ebola Vaccine, 189 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. e1326 
(2017); Matthew Herper et al., From Discovery to Delivery: Public Sector Development of the rVSV-ZEBOV Ebola 
Vaccine, __ J. L. & BIOSCI. __ (2020). 
127 Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Vaccines for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, Can. Patent No. WO 
2004/011488 A2 (filed July 28, 2003). 
128 See Denise Grady, Ebola Vaccine, Ready for Test, Sat on the Shelf, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/24/health/without-lucrative-market-potential- 
ebola-vaccine-was-shelved-for-years.html 
129 See Dan Lett, Wanted: Manufacturer for Ebola and Marburg Vaccines, 173 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 472 (2005). 
130 Id., ib. 
131 GOV’T OF CAN., Sole License Agreement for Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Vaccines for Viral 
Hemorrhagic Fevers, at G1, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/infectious-diseases/viral-
haemorrhagic-fevers/sole-license-agreement-recombinant-vesicular-stomatitis-virus-vaccines-viral-hemorrhagic-
fevers.html 
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NewLink did not invest any resources on testing and manufacturing the vaccine.132 As journalist 
Denise Grady, put it: “Ebola vaccine, ready for test, sat on the shelf.”133
Elsewhere, I have discussed the case of this Ebola vaccine candidate as a transactional 
problem with a salient IP dimension.134 Having originally obtained control over the IP associated 
with the vaccine for $205,000, NewLink did not perform any additional R&D before a large-scale 
outbreak occurred, at which point it negotiated with a large pharmaceutical company (Merck), to 
which it transferred IP rights for 30$ million, with an additional milestone payment of $20 million 
due at the beginning of clinical trials.135 In this transactional sense, IP rights enable rent-seeking 
behaviors that are at odds with public health goals of having vaccines—or other health goods—
come to market as soon as technically and scientifically possible.136
There is nonetheless an additional dimension to this story, which illustrates the 
shortcomings of overreliance on IP incentives as a way to catalyze R&D and bring certain types 
of health goods to market. Even when a patent has already been granted, there are cases in which 
the status quo—be it in the form of patent-related or non-patent incentives—is simply inadequate 
to further preparedness and public health goals. Against a backdrop of little to no economic return 
132 See Plummer & Jones, supra note 126. 
133 Grady, supra note 128. 
134 Rutschman, supra note 122, at 1244-48. 
135 Id., at 1247. See also Stacy Lawrence, Merck, NewLink Nab Up to $76M BARDA Contract to Back Ebola 
Vaccine, FIERCE BIOTECH (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/merck-newlink-nab-up-to-76m-
barda-contract-to-back-ebola-vaccine 
136 The point here is not that transactability of IP rights is problematic. In fact, as a structural feature of IP regimes, 
transactability can promote a more efficient allocation of rights, as well as serve as a catalyst for collaborative R&D. 
In the case at hand, however, the transfer of IP from the public sector to NewLink results in a situation in which the 
new rightsholder instrumentalizes IP to magnify economic returns without having contributed to the R&D process. 
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anticipated in connection with the development of an Ebola vaccine—compounded by the 
prevalence of the associated disease among populations outside the geopolitical lines of the 
developed world—a vaccine that could have been developed and potentially approved before a 
large outbreak struggled to attract private-sector attention, only to remain untouched for years once 
the Canadian government succeeded in licensing it. From an incentives perspective, the primary 
trigger for late-stage R&D was thus the onset of a public health crisis in the form of the 2014-16 
outbreak—the first Ebola outbreak that resulted in the death of a patient on United States soil.137
The current misalignment between IP-centric incentives and preparedness frameworks 
affects some health goods more markedly than others. The development of vaccines targeting 
emerging infectious diseases138—from Ebola to coronaviruses and other pathogens resulting in 
respiratory illness—is among the areas the most affected by this misalignment. If regarded as 
commodifiable goods, vaccines are generally unattractive in terms of return-on-investment:139 they 
are preventatives, leading either to the production of non-events (the inexistence of an outbreak) 
or the mitigation of the effects of the disease (the occurrence of a smaller outbreak, or the 
production of less severe consequences to public and individual health);140 they offer scarce 
137 See Clarence Spigner, Patient Zero: Thomas Eric Duncan and the Ebola Crisis in West Africa and the United 
States, BLACK PAST (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/perspectives-global-african-
history/patient-zero-thomas-eric-duncan-and-ebola-crisis-west-africa-and-united-states/ (chronicling the story of 
Thomas Eric Duncan). 
138 These diseases are characterized as “[o]utbreaks of previously unknown diseases; [k]nown diseases that are 
rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range in the last 2 decades [or p]ersistence of infectious diseases that 
cannot be controlled.” See JOHNS HOPKINS, WHAT ARE EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES?, 
https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/emerging-infectious-diseases 
139 Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note 119. 
140 But see see Rino Rappuoli et al., The Intangible Value of Vaccination, 297 SCI. 937(2002); Meghan L. Stack et 
al., Estimated Economic Benefits During The ‘Decade of Vaccines’ Include Treatment Savings, Gains in Labor 
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possibilities of repeated consumption;141 as biological products, they require costly and specialized 
manufacturing and distribution chains;142 and, in the case of vaccines targeting emerging infectious 
diseases, indicated populations have traditionally been largely confined to economically 
disadvantaged areas of the world, further dimming revenue prospects.143
This dissociation between public health value and market-driven incentives to 
biopharmaceutical R&D is not restricted to vaccines. As the COVID-19 pandemic started to 
unfold, scientists began exploring hundreds of different potential treatments.144 A significant 
number of treatment candidates consisted of repurposed drugs—drugs already in use (or being 
studies) for a different indication.145 Among these, the anti-viral remdesivir146 emerged early on 
Productivity, 30 HEALTH AFF. (2011) (collectively noting economic gains attributable to widespread vaccination of 
indicated populations). 
141 See e.g. WORLD HEALTH ORG., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ROUTINE IMMUNIZATIONS,
https://www.who.int/immunization/policy/Immunization_routine_table1.pdf?ua (listing recommended doses for thet 
most commonly administered vaccines across the world). See also Patricia M. Danzon et al., Vaccine Supply: A 
Cross-National Perspective, 24 HEALTH AFF. 706 (2005). 
142 See e.g. WORLD HEALTH ORG., COLD CHAIN, VACCINES AND SAFE-INJECTION EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT (2008), 
https://www.who.int/immunization/documents/MLM_module1.pdf 
143 Rutschman, IP Preparedness, supra note 122, at 1211 (noting that “[t]he economic footprint of the regions where 
outbreaks occurred in the past have been too small to trigger strong private-sector R&D investment, while interest 
from other players has been overshadowed by more visible neglected diseases like malaria or HIV/AIDS”). 
144 As of September 18, 2020, there were 339 treatment candidates for COVID-19 being tested across the world. 
MILKEN INST., COVID-19 TREATMENT AND VACCINE TRACKER, https://covid-
19tracker.milkeninstitute.org/#treatment_antibodies 
145 See generally Sudeep Pushpakom et al., Drug Repurposing: Progress, Challenges and Recommendations, 18 
NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 41 (2019). 
146 See Katherine Seley-Radtke, Remdesivir Explained – What Makes This Drug Work Against Viruses?, THE 
CONVERSATION (May 6, 2020), https://theconversation.com/remdesivir-explained-what-makes-this-drug-work-
against-viruses-137751 (outlining basic information about remdesivir). 
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as one of the leading candidates,147 and in May 2020 it became the first COVID-19 treatment 
temporarily authorized by the FDA for the treatment of hospitalized patients.148 In August, the 
pharmaceutical company sponsoring remdesivir, Gilead, submitted a new drug application to the 
FDA seeking full approval of the drug.149
While the quick timeline under which remdesivir was developed and tested as a treatment 
for COVID-19 is remarkable, it also points to a misalignment between preparedness standards and 
current R&D models leaning heavily on IP and market forces.150 Remdesivir was originally 
developed through contributions from the United States public sector (through research performed 
at government institutions, such as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases, as well as grants to academic research institutions) and scientists at Gilead, a large 
private-sector pharmaceutical company.151 During the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak, remdesivir was 
147 John H. Beigel et al., Remdesivir for the Treatment of Covid-19 - Preliminary Report, N. ENGL. J. MED. (May 22, 
2020). 
148 GILEAD, Gilead’s Investigational Antiviral Remdesivir Receives U.S. Food and Drug Administration Emergency 
Use Authorization for the Treatment of COVID-19 (May 1, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-
room/press-releases/2020/5/gileads-investigational-antiviral-remdesivir-receives-us-food-and-drug-administration-
emergency-use-authorization-for-the-treatment-of-covid19. 
149 See GILEAD, Gilead Submits New Drug Application to U.S. Food and Drug Administration for Veklury® 
(Remdesivir) for the Treatment of COVID-19 (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-
room/press-releases/2020/8/gilead-submits-new-drug-application-to-us-food-and-drug-administration-for-veklury-
remdesivir-for-the-treatment-of-covid19 
150 See Heled et al., The Problem with Relying on Profit-Driven Models to Produce Pandemic Drugs, supra note 
119. 
151 See Ed Silverman, The U.S. Government Contributed Research to a Gilead Remdesivir Patent — But Didn’t Get 
Credit, STAT (May 8, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2020/05/08/gilead-remdesivir-covid19-
coronavirus-patents/ 
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tested on animals and, after showing promise, progressed to phase 1 clinical trials.152 Nevertheless, 
as the outbreak began to unwind, so did R&D on remdesivir, even though its antiviral potential 
was already well understood.153 Gilead made R&D on remdesivir a priority as soon as the 
magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic became apparent.154 As the company awaits approval from 
the FDA to broadly market remdesivir, it has announced that a full five-day course of treatment—
which costs $10 per dose to manufacture155—will cost $3,120 to Medicare, Medicaid and private 
insurers in the United States,156 while other developed countries will be able to buy the drug at a 
25% discount.157 The company also announced that developing countries would pay “significantly 
less” for remdesivir, without providing further details on specific numbers.158
Thus, while pre-existing R&D turned remdesivir into a leading candidate for the treatment 
of emerging diseases, it was a severe public health crisis that effectively nudged R&D actors to 
see its development through the R&D pipeline. Once again, this is at odds with public health 
152 GILEAD, DEVELOPMENT OF REMDESIVIR, https://www.gilead.com/-/media/gilead-corporate/files/pdfs/covid-
19/gilead_rdv-development-fact-sheet-2020.pdf. See also Ned Pagliarulo, A Closer Look at the Ebola Drug that’s 
Become the Top Hope for a Coronavirus Treatment, BIOPHARMA DIVE (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coronavirus-remdesivir-gilead-antiviral-drug-covid-19/573261/ 
153 See Seley-Radtke, Remdesivir Explained, supra note 146 (noting that remdesivir belongs to “oldest and most 
important classes of drugs”). 
154 GILEAD, DEVELOPMENT OF REMDESIVIR, supra note 152. 
155 Rohan Chalasani & Walid Gellad, The US Is Paying Way Too Much for Remdesivir, WIRED (Jul. 17, 2020), 
https://www.wired.com/story/the-us-is-paying-way-too-much-for-remdesivir/ 
156 See e.g. Sarah Hansen, Gilead Finally Reveals Remdesivir Pricing After Weeks of Speculation, FORBES (Jun. 29, 
2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2020/06/29/gilead-finally-reveals-remdesivir-pricing-after-weeks-
of-speculation/#6e14859a405b. A five-day course of remdesivir will cost $2,340 to the Department of Veterans 
Affairs and the Indian Health Service. Id., ib. 
157 Id., ib. 
158 Id., ib. 
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principles of epidemic and pandemic preparedness, which prioritize investment in, and the 
development of, health goods before a public health crisis occurs.  
This misalignment is not solely attributable to IP frameworks. Yet, it illustrates how 
contemporary constructions of IP as systems of incentives to innovation fit poorly with goals of 
epidemic and pandemic preparedness. In the case of remdesivir, Gilead first applied for a patent 
in the United States in 2015.159 The patent issued in 2019.160 The prospect of imminent patent-
induced market exclusivity was not enough to prioritize pre-pandemic R&D on remdesivir, 
though. 
The repercussions of this dissociation are not insignificant. Once studied in connection 
with Ebola, remdesivir was repurposed to treat a respiratory disease. While this repurposing 
appears to constitute a positive development from a scientific perspective, it is matched by a lack 
of continued R&D in connection with viruses in the Ebola family, as well as corresponding 
opportunity costs. Since the 2014-16 outbreak, there have been four Ebola outbreaks in Africa.161
An outbreak in 2018, affecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo and (to a lesser extent) 
Uganda, registered 3,470 reported cases and a fatality rate of 66%.162 The latest Ebola outbreak, 
also affecting Democratic Republic of the Congo, started on June 1, 2020 and is ongoing at the 
time of writing.163
159 Silverman, supra note 151. 
160 Methods for Treating Arenaviridae and Coronaviridae Virus Infections, U.S. Patent No. 10,251,904B2 (issued 
Apr. 9, 2019). 
161 CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CASES AND OUTBREAKS OF EVD BY YEAR (2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html 
162 Id., ib. 
163 Id., ib. 
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Merck’s Ebola vaccine, known as Erverbo, was finally approved in December 2019, three 
years after the 2014-16 outbreak, 17 years since a patent application was initially filed, and around 
15 years since the Canadian government started looking for a manufacturer.164 As Ebola continues 
to affect primarily populations in economically depressed areas of the globe, the misalignment 
between incentives systems and public health needs is most taxing on some of the most vulnerable 
populations. The World Health Organization’s Regional Office for Africa has surveyed different 
types of socio-economic determinants of health and their impact on health outcomes across the 
African continent.165 IP—be it its pricing facet or its incentives function—is not part of this 
analysis, or of standard literature on the determinants of health. Yet, as the case of pandemic and 
epidemic vaccines and drugs illustrates, IP and IP-adjacent decisions and priorities routinely 
inform levels of public health preparedness across the developing world—by directly influencing 
the types of health technologies available to prevent and respond to outbreaks of infectious 
diseases, and ultimately bearing an imprint in individual and systemic public health outcomes. 
At a different level, the case of remdesivir marries incentives problems with pricing issues 
somewhat similar to the ones described in Part II.A. From the early stages of the coronavirus 
outbreak onwards, studies have repeatedly shown that COVID-19 has placed a disproportionately 
heightened health, social and economic burden on racial minorities and economically 
disadvantaged populations in the United States.166 The current price point for remdesivir is likely 
164 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., First FDA-Approved Vaccine for the Prevention of Ebola Virus Disease, 
Marking a Critical Milestone in Public Health Preparedness and Response (Dec. 19, 2020, 
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/first-fda-approved-vaccine-prevention-ebola-virus-disease-
marking-critical-milestone-public-health 
165 WORLD HEALTH ORG. REGIONAL OFFICE FOR AFRICA, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, 
https://www.afro.who.int/health-topics/social-and-economic-determinants-health 
166
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to further underscore these disparities, which are precisely the type of problem(s) that interventions 
based on determinants of health frameworks seek to correct. For these reasons—as well as the ones 
developed in connection with the next case study—Part III will further make the case for 
considering IP, and in particular the patent system, as a determinant of health. 
C. A CASE STUDY ON AGTECH: GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS
The final case study focuses on an example outside the field of pharmaceuticals and 
vaccines: the case of genetically modified rice, which was developed in response to nutritional 
deficiencies among populations in certain areas of the developing world. Vitamin A deficiency, in 
particular, is one of the leading causes of malnutrition-related morbidity and mortality across the 
Global South.167 Every year, an estimated 1 million children die from causes related to vitamin A-
deficiency, while an additional 350,000 lose their sight.168 In line with other efforts to address this 
pressing public health problem, in the 1990s scientists at European research institutions took the 
first steps towards the genetic modification of a species of rice (Oryza sativa), adding beta-
carotene, which the human body transforms into vitamin A.169 This type of enriched rice became 
known as “Golden Rice” due to its yellowish color, and was hailed as an invention that could 
potentially benefit countless people, and in particular children, in low-income economies, where 
rice has long been the most-consumed crop.170
167 Robert E. Black et al., Maternal and Child Undernutrition: Global and Regional Exposures and Health 
Consequences, 371 LANCET, 243, 243 (2008). 
168 J. Madeleine Nash, This Rice Could Save a Million Kids a Year, TIME (Jul. 31, 2000), 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,997586,00.html. 
169 See Xudong Ye et al., Engineering the Provitamin A (β- Carotene) Biosynthetic Pathway into (Carotenoid-Free) 
Rice Endosperm, 287 SCIENCE 303 (Jan. 14, 2000). 
170 Nash, supra note 168. 
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In order to modify Oryza sativa, scientists incorporated two genes from daffodils and one 
bacterium into the rice species.171 Because scientists involved in the project had relied on pre-
existing technology, they were concerned about the IP landscape surrounding Golden Rice, as well 
as with the prospect of having to negotiate multiple licensing agreements with different 
rightsholders.172 A study conducted in 2000 by the International Service for the Acquisition of 
Agribiotech Applications (ISAAA), an American non-profit tech transfer company, identified a 
minimum of 70 patents “that could have implications for the commercialization” of Golden 
Rice.173 At that point, Golden Rice research had been funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
Swiss Government and the European Union.174 Funding from the European Union required the 
participation of a private-sector company.175 A large British agrochemical and biotech company, 
Zeneca—later AstraZeneca and today, Syngenta—thus joined the project as a research partner. 
Importantly, the company had an exclusive license over one of the genes that scientists had used 
to develop Golden Rice.176
Against the backdrop of potentially costly and protracted IP negotiations, the scientists who 
had invented Golden Rice—and who were interested in making it available to the world’s poorest 
populations—turned to a German startup company, Greenovations, to broker the IP 
171 INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGRI-BIOTECH APPLICATIONS, THE GOLDEN RICE 
TECHNOLOGY, https://www.isaaa.org/kc/inforesources/biotechcrops/The_Golden_Rice_Technology.htm. 
172 RURAL ADVANCEMENT FOUND. INT’L, Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps: A Case Study in the Public Sector’s 
Mismanagement of Intellectual Property [hereinafter Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps], Comunique 66 
(Sept./Oct. 2010), at 2-3. 
173 Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, at 3. 
174 Nash, supra note 168. 
175 Peter Beyer et al., Golden Rice: Introducing the β-Carotene Biosynthesis Pathway into Rice Endosperm by 
Genetic Engineering to Defeat Vitamin A Deficiency, 132 J. NUTRITION 506S (Mar. 1, 2002). 
176 Nash, supra note 168. 
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negotiations.177 The result of the negotiations was two-fold: AstraZeneca obtained an exclusive 
license to commercialize Golden Rice in the Global North, as well as to “medium and large-scale 
farmers” in the Global South;178 the company then granted back to the scientists the right to 
sublicense Golden Rice in the South at no cost.179 Additionally, the company pledged “to give 
regulatory, advisory, and research assistance” to bring Golden Rice to developing economies.180
On its face, the creation of two separate streams to diffuse the innovation, one commercial 
and the other “humanitarian” (as it became known),181 appears to further the interest of populations 
in need while balancing incentives frameworks as currently entrenched in global IP-centric 
industries. 
Nevertheless, a closer look at the information supporting the finding of a patent thicket in 
ISAAA’s survey reveals a different IP landscape. The decision to grant an exclusive license to a 
large agtech company rested, according to one of the inventors of Golden Rice,182 on the 
understanding shared by scientists and funders alike that diffusion of the invention—even through 
the humanitarian stream—faced a “severe intellectual property rights problem.”183 The problem 
was characterized by the inventor as insurmountable but for the collaboration with AstraZeneca, 
which held one of the blocking patents.184 In late 2000, however, a study by the Rural 
Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) showed that ISAAA’s pre-licensure survey vastly 
177 Beyer, supra note 175. 
178 Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172, at 3 (“medium and large-scale farmers” were defined as 
those who sold more than $10,000 of Golden Rice). 
179 Beyer, supra note 175. 
180 Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172. 
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overstated the number of patents at stake.185 Instead of a minimum of 70 and up to 105 patents, as 
identified by ISAAA, RAFI’s study showed that there were only 11 relevant patents at a 
maximum.186 Part of the reason for the overcalculation had to do with the fact that several of the 
patents in ISAAA’s calculations had actually been accounted for twice based on (or under the 
guise of) different numbers issued by the U.S. and the European patent offices.187 When corrected 
for duplicate entries, the number came down to 44.188
Moreover, the ISAAA survey expressly made the point that IP rights would likely prevent 
distribution of Golden Rice across most of the South, even if the inventors made them available 
for free: “widespread release of the current version of GoldenRice™ will require significant 
licensing activity if it is to legitimately become available to the world, either commercially or for 
humanitarian purposes.”189
The post-licensure study again showed that not to be the case. In over 50% of the countries 
with serious levels of vitamin A deficiency (35 out of 60), there were no patents covering any of 
the technology involved in Golden Rice.190 In the remaining countries, only 12 patents were found 
to be potentially relevant.191 At the same time, among the dozen countries with populations with 
vitamin A deficiency who “consume rice in sufficient quantity to make them potential targets,” 
half had no relevant patents.192
185 Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172, at 3. 
186 Id., ib.
187 Id., at 4. 
188 Id., ib.
189 David R. Kryder et al., The Intellectual and Technical Property Components of pro-Vitamin A rice 
(GoldenRice™): A Preliminary Freedom-to-Operate Review (2000) ISAAA BRIEF 20 (2000). 
190 Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps, supra note 172, at 4. 
191 Id., ib.
192 Id., ib.
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It should be pointed out that, as a genetically modified food product, Golden Rice has been 
met with concern and criticism by several commentators, activists and organizations. Some of the 
issues that have been raised are health-focused and relate to the larger question of the impact of 
genetically modified crops on human health.193 Others are ecological and relate to the effects and 
sustainability of the shift in farming practices introduced by Golden Rice and similar genetically 
engineered products.194 Others still speak to ongoing debates on the stringency—or lack thereof—
of current regulatory regimes for biotechnology.195
While Golden Rice has not been approved for commercialization in affluent countries, 
regulatory agencies in the Global North (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States) 
have evaluated Golden Rice at the request of the International Rice Research Institute,196 a large 
intergovernmental research institute based in the Philippines.197 All four regulatory agencies 
declared to have “no further questions” about the safety of Golden Rice.198 In December 2019, the 
Department of Agriculture in the Philippines approved Golden Rice for use as food, feed and for 
processing,199 and a similar regulatory approval process is currently underway in Bangladesh.200
193 See e.g. Dan Charles, In A Grain of Golden Rice, A World Of Controversy Over GMO Foods, NPR (Mar. 7, 
2013), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2013/03/07/173611461/in-a-grain-of-golden-rice-a-world-of-
controversy-over-gmo-foods 
194 Nash, supra note 168. 
195 Id., ib. 
196 See e.g. Brian Owens, Golden Rice is Safe to Eat, Says FDA, 36 NATURE BIOTECH. 559 (2018). 
197 INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, https://www.irri.org. 
198 Owens, Golden Rice is Safe to Eat, supra note 196. 
199 Katherine J. Wu, Golden Rice Approved as Safe for Consumption in the Philippines, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 3, 
2020), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/golden-rice-approved-safe-consumption-philippines-
180973897/. 
200 INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, Philippines Approves Golden Rice for Direct Use as Food and Feed, 
or for Processing, (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.irri.org/news-and-events/news/philippines-approves-golden-rice-
direct-use-food-and-feed-or-processing. 
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This is not to opine on the merits of Golden Rice in itself, a topic completely outside the 
scope of this article. A large portion of the story of this product of modern agtech is steeped in 
complex scientific, social and policy queries. Likewise, from a legal perspective, the history of 
Golden Rice also threads into a more complex universe of domestic and transnational regulatory 
choices affecting food regimes. But there is a core component of the Golden Rice case that 
illuminates ongoing challenges at the intersection of IP and public health: a product of 
biotechnology, and more specifically of agtech, which may have an impact on nutrition levels 
across several of the most impoverished areas of the Global South, is covered by a plurality of 
patents that exacerbate informational asymmetries between inventors and holders of patent rights 
covering ancillary technologies.201
It is also worth noting that Golden Rice—as was the case with the technologies surveyed 
in the previous sections—does not constitute an isolated case in the field of biotechnology. Other 
examples of genetically modified foods developed in patent-dense environments include ferritin-
enriched lettuce in Japan,202 disease-resistant papayas in Hawaii203 and disease-resistant dwarf 
wheat in India.204
III. TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE IP DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH
A. THE EXISTING IP FRAMEWORK
201 See infra, Part III.A. 
202 Ismail Cakmak & Ross M. Welch, IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURE ON HUMAN HEALTH AND NUTRITION 2, at 138-154. 
203 Michael Goldman, The IP Management of the PRSV-Resistant Papayas Developed by Cornell University and the 
University of Hawaii and Commercialized in Hawaii, http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch17/p27/. 
204 David Biello, Norman Borlaug: Wheat Breeder Who Averted Famine with a "Green Revolution," SCI. AM. BLOG
(Sept. 14, 2009), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/news-blog/norman-borlaug-wheat-breeder-who-av-2009-09-
14/. 
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As seen in Part I, the fields of the determinants of health and of IP have largely operated 
as separate doctrinal categories, even though there are multiple ways in which patent laws and 
norms directly affect health outcomes and risk in countries in the Global South and North alike. 
Arguably, a balanced implementation of the TRIPs Agreement could have helped curb 
some of the rights-maximizing behaviors that have repeatedly resulted in price gouging and the 
exclusion of populations in need of critical inventions protected by patents. Article 7 subjects both 
the protection and the enforcement of IP right to “the mutual advantage of producers and users” of 
protected goods, a “balance of rights and obligations” and the larger principle of the promotion of 
“social and economic welfare.”205 This balancing approach is further complemented by article 8, 
which establishes that countries may adopt additional measures “to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology,” as long as these measures are 
consistent with the letter and the spirit of the TRIPs Agreement.206
Even though TRIPs provides the theoretical foundation to address some of the current 
imbalances in the diffusion of health-related innovations,207 implementation processes have often 
205 TRIPs Agreement, art. 7. 
206 TRIPs Agreement, art. 8.2. 
207 See e.g. Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 Hous. L. Rev. 797 (2009). 
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veered away from balancing tenets, as many scholars have observed,208 a trend underscored by the 
adoption of maximalist approaches in bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements.209
Exploring the ways in which there may be meaningful links between IP laws and 
frameworks for determinants of health entails making the case that TRIPs article 7 should become 
central to current and future applications of international and domestic IP laws, both at the 
legislative and interpretive levels. The connection between (purportedly) innovation-promoting 
regimes and the dissemination of health-related goods is given enhanced attention in TRIPs, as 
article 8 expressly forecasts the need to give the areas of “public health” and “nutrition” a 
particularized treatment at the national level: “Members may, in formulating or amending their 
laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition (…) provided 
that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”210 The provision further 
extends the possibility of the adoption of additional measures to cases in which countries may need 
“to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.”211 While vastly underused, article 8 does provide enabling language 
208 See e.g. SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (2003); GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, EDS. A NEOFEDERALIST VISION OF 
TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (2012); Jerome H. Reichman, 
The TRIPs Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the Developing Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 441 (2000); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Reichman & Dreyfuss, 
Harmonization Without Consensus, supra note 33. 
209 See e.g. Ruth Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?, supra note 25; Bryan Mercurio, TRIPs-Plus Provisions in FTAs: 
Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM, LORAND BARTELS & FEDERICO 
ORTINO EDS. (2006); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan & Annette Kur, Enough is Enough - The Notion of Binding 
Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR INTELL. PROP., COMPETITION &
TAX L. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 09-01 (2009). 
210 TRIPs Agreement, art. 8.1. 
211 Id., ib.
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that could support the establishment of national regimes that leave much less room for behaviors 
like price gouging by explicitly incorporating a balancing mechanism—such as a fair pricing 
requirement which could cap the increase of the price of pharmaceuticals, for example. 
The TRIPs carve-out for public health and nutrition was developed by the Doha 
Declaration,212 which states that 
(…) the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health. 
Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.213
A particular type of TRIPs-compatible intervention that some countries in the Global South 
have taken advantage of in the field of pharmaceuticals has been compulsory licensing.214 Under 
TRIPs 31, domestic patent laws can allow for the “authorization by the government to itself or to 
a third party to use the patent without the permission of the patent holder.”215 The Doha Declaration 
both clarified and expanded the cases in which national governments may issue compulsory 
licenses.216 Importantly, the Declaration specifically addressed the public health toll posed by 
epidemics, “including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis [and] malaria” and made it clear 
212 See Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the 
Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L., Vol. 
921 (2007); Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 30. 
213 Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health [hereinafter Doha Declaration], Doc. WT/ 
MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001), para. 4. 
214 TRIPs Agreement, art. 31 (laying out the procedural and substantive frameworks for compulsory licensing). 
215 Y. Tayler, Battling HIV/AIDS: A Decision-Maker’s Guide to the Procurement of Medicines and Related Supplies, 
cited in FREDERICK ABBOTT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD 
ECONOMY (2007), at 271. 
216 Doha Declaration, para. 5.b-c. 
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that countries have the freedom to determine “what constitutes a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency” for the purposes of issuing a compulsory license on a drug 
needed to address an epidemic or other form of public health crisis.217 A first wave of countries 
that resorted to compulsory licensing in the context of infectious disease outbreaks included 
Thailand218 and Brazil,219 both in connection with HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenz. 
TRIPs, as informed by Doha, thus expresses a particular concern with abuses or 
insufficiencies of IP regimes that may have a direct impact on health-related issues, and provides 
countries with the ability to incorporate tools to respond to these problems in their domestic laws. 
As documented in IP scholarship, and as illustrated by the case study on HIV-prevention drugs in 
the United States, these tools have only been used in limited circumstances. For instance, while 
holding great potential, compulsory licensing has been sparse across the Global South, and driven 
primarily by the larger economies of the South.220
Furthermore, even though TRIPs contributes the legal framework for individual countries 
to address the over-maximization of patent rights resulting in price gouging and exclusion of 
217 Doha Declaration, para. 5.c. 
218 INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., Thailand Issues Compulsory Licence [sic] For Patented AIDS 
Drug (Dec. 13, 2006), https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/thailand-issues-compulsory-licence-for-
patented-aids-drug. See also generally HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF 
PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2008) (describing other instances of compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceuticals—or threat thereof—in the Global South). 
219 INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., Brazil Issues Compulsory Licence [sic]For Aids Drug (May 8, 
2007), http://www.ictsd.org/brazil-issues-compulsory-licence-for-aids-drug. 
220 A recent development that bolstered the compulsory licensing framework for pharmaceutical—and which gives 
countries in the Global South additional tools to address public health crises—was a 2017 amendment to TRIPs, 
which codified the possibility of compulsory licenses being issued for the export of pharmaceuticals, replacing a 
temporary waiver under paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. TRIPs Agreement, art. 31bis. See also William New, 
It’s Official: TRIPS Health Amendment in Effect, First Ever to A WTO Agreement, IP WATCH (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/01/23/official-trips-health-amendment-effect-first-ever-wto-agreement/. 
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populations indicated for a drug, there is little enabling power in the Agreement to address issues 
related to other aspects of IP—namely problems surrounding incentives for drugs regarded as 
having limited markets. The case study in Part II addressed the case of vaccines for infectious 
diseases, but drugs targeting neglected tropical diseases221 or orphan diseases222 face similar 
incentives problems. Similarly, TRIPs-based solutions can do little to address the types of 
informational asymmetries in bargaining that are common in practice, as seen in the case of Golden 
Rice. 
The following section suggests that viewing IP as a determinant of health might be useful 
to locate additional fixes for ongoing problems rooted in patent regimes that detrimentally affect 
health outcomes and health risks.  
B. COMPLEMENTING THE TOOLKIT OF DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH THROUGH IP 
Interventions informed by determinants of health frameworks may indirectly address some 
disfunctions originating in patent regimes. However, they are limited in scope and are unlikely to 
address, let alone remove, the cause of the IP-related phenomenon that aggravates negative health 
outcomes and increases health risks. Consider the case of HIV prevention drugs discussed above. 
An intervention affecting one or more determinants—e.g. income or education levels—might 
mitigate the problem for individual patients, and thus produce effects on ad hoc basis, but it is 
unlikely to provide any mechanisms that can be used in the short-term to prevent systemic 
221 WORLD HEALTH ORG., NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES, https://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en/. 
222 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ORPHAN PRODUCTS: HOPE FOR PEOPLE WITH RARE DISEASES, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/orphan-products-hope-people-rare-diseases. 
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infection. Moreover, they cannot eliminate the root of excessive pricing practices, which in itself 
represents a malfunction of a legal regime.  
In this section, the article turns to possible pathways to mitigate the impact of IP-enabled 
behaviors that detrimentally affect health outcomes and health risks. The first one is aimed at 
problems that currently allow for excessive pricing of health-related goods (such as price gouging 
of HIV prevention drugs) or uncertainties surrounding the IP status of ancillary technologies 
needed to develop products capable of lessening malnutrition or other ailments through non-
clinical interventions (such as the case of cloudy information and bargaining asymmetries in the 
licensure of Golden Rice): it shows how existing legal mechanisms—liability rules—can be 
tailored to offset some of the problems surveyed in Part II. The second pathway focuses on an 
emerging solution to the incentives side of the problem: transnational partnerships that have 
emerged in the health space (such as the case of scarcely incentivized R&D on vaccines). These 
are not meant to be complete treatment of the areas surveyed, but rather an indication of possible 
pathways that can be pursued under a view that certain components of IP regimes produce effects 
that can determine—and often do determine—the production of undesirable health outcomes, or 
the accentuation of health risks among vulnerable populations. 
More broadly, the article notes that recognizing the role of IP as a determinant of health 
also sheds light on the need for a greater cross-pollination between traditional institutional IP and 
non-IP actors, particularly at the international level. 
Certain embodiments of IP—dysfunctional ones, but in any case, actual ones—have 
contributed towards the creation of patent regimes in which the grant of proprietary rights may be 
instrumentally used to restrict access to pharmaceutical or biotech products that can be used to 
improve health outcomes and reduce health risks. One of those instrumental uses of IP results in 
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the excessive pricing of pharmaceuticals, as illustrated by the example of Truvada for PrEP in the 
context of an HIV epidemic. Another constitutes a byproduct of the creation of patent thickets 
around health-related technologies, as seen in the case of Golden Rice, a behavior that increases 
transaction costs, obscures informational signals and accentuates bargaining imbalances between 
rightsholders and follow-on innovators.  
The most direct fix for these types of problems is located at the national level through 
legislative or governmental interventions, or both. In Europe, for instance, there are price controls 
in place that impede some of the extreme gouging that occurs with regard to pharmaceuticals in 
the United States.223 International IP law, through compulsory licensing regimes as outlined above, 
provides governments with an operational framework to address problems related to the scarcity 
of health-related goods on the supply side. 
These types of interventions, however, are often fraught with practical and political 
economy constraints. In the United States, for instance, pre-TRIPs (and TRIPs-compatible) 
legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act,224 gives the government the ability to “march-in” on patents held 
by entities in the private-sector covering publicly funded inventions.225 Funding agencies retain 
the ability to force the licensure of inventions to third parties in certain situations, including 
instances in which forced licensure is needed to “alleviate health or safety needs which are not 
223 See e.g. Austin Frakt, To Reduce the Cost of Drugs, Look to Europe, N.Y. Times (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/upshot/to-reduce-the-cost-of-drugs-look-to-europe.html; David Gross et al., 
International Pharmaceutical Spending Controls: France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,15 HEALTH 
CARE FIN. REV. 127 (1994). 
224 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). 
225 35 U.S.C. § 203. 
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reasonably satisfied” by the way the rightsholder is practicing the invention.226 In practice, 
however, no “march-in” petitions have ever been granted in the United States, even though they 
have been brought in connection with pharmaceutical drugs.227
While legal frameworks enabling the government-administered licensure of patents (under 
certain circumstances and subject to certain criteria) exist in domestic IP regimes in the North and 
South, they have so far proved underused, with the exception of a few countries in the South .228
An alternative to the ex post intervention of governments through compulsory licensing is 
the ex ante establishment of liability regimes for certain types of patentable innovation—in the 
case at hand, in the form of a tailored liability regime focused on health-related areas that would 
allow for the forced licensure of technology needed when public health crises occur. 
Elsewhere, I have explored the possibility of liability regimes in connection with patentable 
vaccine technology.229 This framework may also be useful to mimic the effects of compulsory 
licensing in cases in which this mechanism, even though lawfully applicable, is not available for 
political economy or other reasons. Liability rules enable a second comer to use someone else’s 
226 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). See also, A Rare Deterrent to Limitless Drug Price Increases May Die Under Trump, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2019) (quoting the academic view that “[t]he idea that the price is too high fits pretty 
comfortably in the wording of the statute.”), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-rare-deterrent-
to-limitless-drug-price-increases-may-die-under-trump/2019/04/17/7578e5e0-5bcd-11e9-a00e-
050dc7b82693_story.html. 
227 See e.g. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF THE DIR., DETERMINATION IN THE CASE OF PETITION OF CELLPRO,
INC., https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/cellpro-marchin.pdf (denying a march-in petition 
of a stem cell separation device based on § 203(a)(2) public health grounds). 
228 See e.g. Ryan Whalen, Will the Agencies Ever Go Marching In? Public Rights in Federally-Funded Inventions, 
109 NW. U. L. REV. (2015) (providing an overview of the landscape in the United States). 
229 Ana Santos Rutschman, Property and Intellectual Property in Vaccine Markets, 5 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. __ 
(2020); The Vaccine Race, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
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entitlement without consent and against the payment of an “objectively determined value.”230 This 
approach is in sharp contrast with proprietary modes of innovation, in which one or more patents 
shield the invention from unauthorized uses by second comers.231
Consider how these two regimes would operate differently in cases in which second comers 
have the ability to manufacture follow-on versions of prophylactic or preventative drugs and 
vaccines: under property rules, a follow-on innovator wishing to commercialize a cheaper version 
of such a drug or vaccine would need not only to obtain permission from the patentee(s), but also 
to support the transaction costs associated with the bargaining and licensure processes. If the 
patentee refused to negotiate, as it is currently allowed to, the follow-on innovator would not be 
able to make, use or distribute the technology (or perform protected processes) for the duration of 
the relevant patent(s). By contrast, under a liability model, the same innovator would not have to 
wait for permission to commercialize a competing product. Rather, the second comer would “take 
and pay” for the technology irrespective of the will of the patentee, who would nonetheless be 
monetarily compensated by a third-party use of the technology.232
230 See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). See also William W. Fisher III, Property Rules v. 
Liability Rules, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (DAVID KENNEDY AND WILLIAM W. FISHER III,
EDS.) (2007); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1997); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral 
in Another Light, 70 N. Y. U. L. REV. 440 (1995); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Property Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex 
Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 601 (2001); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE 
L.J. (1997).; Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Patents: One 
Experimental View of the Cathedral, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 138 (2011). 
231 Calabresi & Melamed, ib.
232 Jack M. Balkin & Ian Ayres, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 
YALE L. J. 703, 704 (1996). 
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This example should not be understood as a suggestion that all types of socially valuable 
innovation—or even innovation in the pharmaceutical and agtech fields—should be subjected to 
liability frameworks. Rather, as in previous writings,233 my argument here is that it is possible to 
utilize existing legal constructs in narrowly tailored ways to address especially acute cases of 
transactional inefficiencies known to contribute to an increase in health risks or poor health 
outcomes for especially vulnerable populations. I have argued in the past that a closed-list, 
narrowly defined liability regime covering some components needed to develop vaccines against 
emerging pathogens would warrant consideration by policy- and lawmakers,234 especially as patent 
holders generally do not expect a meaningful return-on-investment in this area.235 Conversely, a 
liability regime covering next-generation vaccine technology—such as the seemingly imminent 
case of mRNA vaccines which might be coming to market in the wake of the COVID-19 
pandemic236—would be ill-advised, as the R&D landscape in this area is much more populated, 
well-funded and programmatically different from the lacking R&D pipeline that unites the case 
studies presented in Part II.  
233 See Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the Twenty-First Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729, 762-770 
(2019); id., Property and Intellectual Property in Vaccine Markets, supra note 229. 
234 The Vaccine Race in the Twenty-First Century, at 767. But see id. at 768-769 (acknowledging the drawbacks of 
this proposal, including the likely need for legislative intervention to establish such a liability regime, however 
tailored). For an example of a different type of tailored liability regime proposed by legal scholars, consider for 
instance the work of Jerome Reichman and Tracey Lewis, who have proposed a liability regime focused on 
traditional knowledge and specifically designed to encourage small-scale innovation in developing countries. See 
Jerome H. Reichman & Tracey Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: 
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER 
A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (KEITH E. MASKUS & JEROME H. REICHMAN, EDS) (2005), at 354-
365. 
235 See e.g. COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS (CEPI), PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN, 2017-
2021 (Nov. 2016) (noting that “it is anticipated that vaccines developed with CEPI support will not be profitable”). 
236 See e.g. Lisa A. Jackson et al., An mRNA Vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 — Preliminary Report, N. ENGL. J. MED. 
(Jul. 14, 2020). 
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Beyond these particular illustrations, the broader point here is that there are legal solutions 
that would be less taxing of the political economy than some of the IP mechanisms considered (but 
seldom used) to address large public health crises, such as compulsory licensing to march-in 
rights.237
From an international IP perspective, narrowly tailored liability regimes targeting a specific 
and limited set of health goods or technologies would be compatible with the TRIPs precept that 
patents should be granted across fields of technology.238 A liability approach, especially if 
implemented surgically, does not do away with the metaphoric bundle of rights conferred by the 
grant of a patent, but rather limits the ability of the rights holder to refuse to license in exchange 
for a compensatory payment—which should offset some of the economic losses potentially 
endured by the rightsholder—in areas in which market-driven business models render return-on-
investment difficult or, in some cases, virtually impossible.239
From a public health perspective, tailored liability regimes have the potential to make 
follow-on innovation less cumbersome (from a transactional perspective) and less costly in areas 
in which the development and production of critical health goods is traditionally 
underincentivized. As such, they constitute an example of an IP intervention that is closely aligned 
with the goals of corrective interventions informed by determinants of health frameworks. For 
instance, given the heightened importance of active ingredients in drugs needed to prevent HIV 
infection (or components of engineered crops or foods), a narrowly construed liability regime 
could be created for these critical components in cases of significant public health need. If created, 
237 Supra, Part III.A. See also Sapna Kumar, Patents, Pharma, and the Pandemic, __ (forthcoming, __) (on file with 
author). 
238 TRIPs Agreement, Article 27.1 (establishing patent protection for meritorious inventions in “in all fields of 
technology”). 
239 See supra, note 235. 
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a liability regime could be instrumental in attracting follow-on innovators (in the form of generic 
competitors) during epidemics of infectious diseases like HIV, or to boost competition for 
interventions targeting malnutrition in rural areas or the Global South. Similarly, a liability regime 
can instill competition in markets in which, through a combination of IP and non-IP determinants 
of health, certain populations have limited or no access to life-changing or life-saving drugs. 
In this sense, and although liability regimes are often discussed as mechanisms designed 
to further economic efficiency by reducing transaction costs,240 they also promote distributive 
justice241—which is one of the main goals of interventions based on determinants of health 
frameworks—as they facilitate the development of, and access to, critical health technologies that 
are needed to improve health outcomes and reduce health risks. 
The proposal sketched above focuses on an intervention aimed primarily at addressing 
transactional issues related to IP and enabling follow-on innovation, particularly in areas where 
lack of affordable goods or technologies is bound to result in detrimental effects to health risks 
and outcomes. Liability regimes, however, cannot guarantee that a certain drug or food technology 
will be produced in the first place. A different type of solution is needed to respond to problems 
arising in situations of insufficient incentives to R&D provided (at least partly) by IP regimes. In 
response to this need, the creation of large-scale public-private partnerships has recently emerged 
as a form of transnational self-organization designed to counter lacking incentives regimes in 
biopharmaceutical R&D.242
240 See e.g. Calabresi & Melamed, One View of the Cathedral, supra note 230, at 1093; Kaplow & Shavell, Property 
Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, supra note 230. 
241 Calabresi & Melamed, One View of the Cathedral, at 1106. 
242 See generally CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
GOVERNANCE, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, MARGARET CHON ET AL., EDS. (2018).; Jon F. Merz, World 
Health Org., Intellectual Property and Product Development Public/Private Partnerships (2005); Roy Widdus, 
Public-private Partnerships for Health: Their Main Targets, Their Diversity, and Their Future Directions, 79 BULL.
WORLD HEALTH ORG. 713 (2001), 
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As seen in Part II, drugs and vaccines needed to both prevent and respond to public health 
crises—from infectious diseases now largely concentrated in economically disadvantaged areas 
like HIV to events felt at a global scale like COVID-19—are among the most routinely 
underfunded tools in public health preparedness. Until the early 2000s, there were very few 
multilateral responses to problems posed by the misalignment between IP incentives frameworks 
and R&D on underfunded diseases.243
One of the earliest attempts to address the lacking incentives framework for traditionally 
underfunded diseases resulted in the formation of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative 
(DNDi) in 2003.244 DNDi is a non-profit R&D organization focused on the development of 
“urgently needed treatments for neglected patients” at “affordable” prices.245 The diseases targeted 
by the organization are largely prevalent in, although not exclusive to, the Global South: sleeping 
sickness, Chagas disease, cutaneous and visceral leishmaniasis, hepatitis C, river blindness, 
mycetoma and pediatric HIV.246
From 2003 to 2023, DNDi operates with funding from the public (57%) and private (43%) 
sectors.247 Public donors include governments and public-sector institutions from countries in 
Europe (including the European Union), Asia, America and Australia, as well non-profit 
organizations like Unitaid and The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.248
Among the governmental funders, there are several emerging economies of the Global South, 
243 See Merz, supra note 242. 
244 DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, https://dndi.org 
245 Id., ib. 
246 DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, DISEASES, https://dndi.org/diseases/ 
247 DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, OUR DONORS, https://dndi.org/about/donors/ 
248 DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, OUR DONORS: PUBLIC DONORS, https://dndi.org/about/public-
donors/ 
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including Brazil, Colombia and Thailand.249 And in contrast with recent trends in international 
cooperation, the United States remains a funder to DNDi through the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID).250
Private funding is provided through heterogenous donor types, including different branches 
of Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders), several foundations (including the Bill & 
Melinda Gates, the Stavros Niarchos and the Rockefeller Foundations in the United States, the 
Carlos Slim Foundation in Mexico and the Medicor Foundation in Liechtenstein), the Japanese 
pharmaceutical Takeda, the Wellcome Trust in the United States, private companies operating 
outside the health arena (including Goldman, Sachs & Co.), as well as named individuals and 
anonymous individual and foundation donors.251
DNDi likens its role to that of “a conductor of a ‘virtual orchestra’ of over 180 partners 
around the world to develop treatments for patients – not profits (…) [b]y bringing together the 
public, private, academic, non-profit, and philanthropic sectors…”252 By supporting and 
coordinating R&D specifically targeted to traditionally underfunded diseases and underserved 
populations, DNDi was one of the earliest public-private partnerships operating in the 
pharmaceutical R&D space.253 Between the early 2000s and the late 2010s, dozens of public-
private partnerships dedicated to pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical R&D were launched every 
year.254 Some took a more general-purpose approach to innovative R&D: for instance, the 
249 Id., ib.
250 Id., ib.
251 DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, OUR DONORS: PRIVATE DONORS, https://dndi.org/about/private-
donors/ 
252 DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, HOW WE WORK, https://dndi.org/about/how-we-work/ 
253 See Merz, supra note 242, at 17. 
254 Id. See also Mark D. Lim, Commentary, Consortium Sandbox: Building and Sharing Resources, SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. (Jun. 25, 2014). 
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Innovative Medicines Initiative,255 to date the largest public-private partnership in the life sciences, 
op to drug R&D in general, operates in 12 strategic areas, ranging from antimicrobial resistance to 
cardiovascular, neurodegenerative, psychiatric and respiratory diseases.256 Others, by contrast, 
chose to focus in a single area, as is the case of the Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria 
Biopharmaceutical Accelerator (CARB-X), which funds “antibacterial research to tackle the 
global rising threat of drug-resistant bacteria.”257 Yet others are more oriented towards the 
development of a specific type or types of health technologies. A recent and already salient 
example is the case of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), a public-
private partnership launched in the wake of the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak as a direct response to the 
longstanding and widely acknowledge underinvestment in R&D on vaccines, particularly in the 
field of emerging infectious diseases.258 Launched in 2017, CEPI was designed as a “gap filler,” 
funding and coordinating the development of new vaccines for diseases classified by the World 
Health Organization as emerging and in need of “priority” R&D.259 Less than three years later, as 
the COVID-19 pandemic began to unfold, CEPI was among the earliest and most significant 
funders of R&D on COVID-19 vaccines.260
All the organizations mentioned above operate predominantly as (co)funders and 
coordinators of R&D efforts among a plurality of transnational entities. They are known in the 
255 INNOVATIVE MEDICINES INITIATIVE, ABOUT IMI, https://www.imi.europa.eu/about-imi. 
256 INNOVATIVE MEDICINES INITIATIVE, STRATEGIC RESEARCH AGENDA, https://www.imi.europa.eu/about-
imi/strategic-research-agenda 
257 CARB-X, ABOUT CARB-X, https://carb-x.org/about/overview/ 
258 CEPI, WHY WE EXIST, http://cepi.net/about/whyweexist/ 
259  CEPI, PRELIMINARY BUSINESS PLAN 2017-2021 (2016), at 7, https://cepi.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CEPI- 
Preliminary-Business-Plan-061216_0.pdf. See also Rutschman, The Intellectual Property of Vaccines, supra note 
119, at 182. 
260 CEPI, CEPI to Fund Three Programmes to Develop Vaccines Against the Novel Coronavirus, nCoV-2019 (Jan. 
23, 2020), https://cepi.net/news_cepi/cepi-to-fund-three-programmes- to-develop-vaccines-against-the-novel-
coronavirus-ncov-2019/ 
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literature as “product development” public-private partnerships, as opposed to “access 
partnerships,” which typically place large advance orders of goods (either fully developed or 
undergoing development, as is presently the case with COVID-19 vaccines261) as a way to nudge 
the development and manufacturing of products that can then be distributed at relatively affordable 
prices.262
One the earliest examples of a health-oriented public-private partnership was Gavi, the 
Vaccine Alliance, which was established in Switzerland in 2000 and quickly became the 
coordinator of the largest procurement mechanism for childhood vaccines needed in the Global 
South.263 Gavi is now involved in the procurement of vaccines targeting COVID-19 through the 
COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility (COVAX), a partnership created in summer 2020 to 
address the twin problems of manufacturing and allocation of vaccines at the global level.264
Through COVAX, Gavi has placed orders with different pharmaceutical before for vaccines that 
have yet to be approved by the competent regulatory authorities at the domestic level (such as the 
European Medicines Agency or the U.S. Food and Drug Administration).265 These advance 
commitments allow for at-risk manufacturing of vaccines, paving the way for as quick a 
distribution as possible of the first batches of vaccine—provided that such distribution is cleared 
by regulatory authorities.266
261 See e.g. Helen Branswell, WHO, Partners Unveil Ambitious Plan to Deliver 2 Billion Doses of Covid-19 Vaccine 
to High-Risk Populations, STAT (Jun. 26, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/26/who-partners-unveil-
ambitious-plan-to-deliver-2-billion-doses-of-covid-19-vaccine-to-high-risk-populations/ (describing the formation 
of the public-private partnership COVAX). 
262 See generally Merz, supra note 242 (describing the differences between product development and access 
partnerships). 
263 GAVI, ABOUT OUR ALLIANCE, https://www.gavi.org/our-alliance/about 
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Critically, the combination of product development and access partnerships illustrates the 
interdependence of incentives regimes, R&D processes and the political economy. Addressing the 
problems posed by the ongoing underfunding of certain diseases (or types of health technologies) 
is bound to require a multiplicity of interventions, involving heterogenous players across 
geopolitical borders. Insofar as some of these problems are umbilically connected to IP dynamics, 
many non-IP players have played an integral role in transnational collaborations aimed at 
improving current R&D frameworks and enhancing access to health goods by populations in need. 
Conversely, IP players, norms and policies have shaped the living conditions, health risks and 
health outcomes of populations across the globe—especially in economically depressed or 
otherwise underserved areas of both the South and the North. 
A holistic understanding of IP as a determinant of health will thus likely translate into the 
recognition that it is necessary to amplify IP debates in public health arenas and other non-IP 
venues, and to further recognize the role of transnational non-IP public health actors in 
interventions that have the potential to mitigate some the imbalances introduced (or accentuated) 
by overly proprietary IP regimes. At the same time, actors moved by determinants of health 
frameworks would likely benefit from becoming more IP-literate and increase their interaction 
with traditional IP players (such as the World Intellectual Property Organization or offices offering 
technical assistant in the field of IP at the domestic level), as well as with players in indirect IP 
fora—from the World Health Organization267 to public-private partnerships operating in 
pharmaceutical R&D or other fields related to public health.  
267 See Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Essential Medicines and Culture Clash: How Competition between the WTO and 
WHO Shaped Global IP Regimes (draft on file with author). 
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CONCLUSION
If IP is the default regime to incentivize innovation—including pharmaceutical, 
biopharmaceutical and agricultural innovation—then the ways in which these types of innovation 
are produced, distributed or made available may have an impact on non-clinical factors that 
directly influence to health risks and outcomes. This article has provided an overview of how 
certain embodiments of post-TRIPs IP have come to have such an influence, primarily in ways 
that exclude or limit the access of certain population to critical health goods. The article has further 
posited that IP can and should be regarded as a determinant of health proper. This understanding 
would enable law and policymakers, as well as activists in non-IP domains, to consider additional 
solutions when seeking to remedy structural inequities affecting health risks and outcomes. 
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